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1. Introduction,
Theoretical Background, and Analytical Framework
Relarions between Turkey and the European Union have developed a new 
dynamic after the sides have signed the Customs Union Agreement, which came into 
effect in the beginning of 1996. Initiating the final phase of Turkey's economic 
integration with the European Union the Agreement marks the current peak of relations 
that started with the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963.
With the relations having taken a remaricable qualitative jump at this stage, it 
is deemed appropriate to adress the simple question "What next?"U Whereas some 
scholars interpret the contract of a Customs Union between Turkey and the European 
Union as the highest level of integration Turkey will ever be able to obtain^, officials 
in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) still place Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union on the top of their agenda. Arguing in favour of a model of 
differentiated integration, which is believed to come into being as a result of the 
currently held Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), MFA diplomats strongly 
advocate their cause for finding "Turkey's proper place in Europe"^.
Despite the enthusiasm brought about by the successful negotiations over 
Customs Union, praised as "very encouraging"'*, the question ramains about the 
future shape of Turkish-European relations. While predictions are difficult to make at 
a time when all certainties seem to be evaporating, it is most striking that even an 
account of the current state of affairs turns out to be a toilsome endeavour. Many 
scholars uphold the point of view that at the present time it seems justified to state that 
Turkey’s relations with Europe still remain largely undefined. In March 1996, after all
*KRAMER, Heinz (1994): Wie weiter in den Beziehungen zur Türkei?, SWP-AP 2871, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Oktober 1994; Ebenhausen.
^Interview with Prof. Dr. Duygu B. Sezer, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, 
Ankara, 3 June 1996.
^Interview with Nihat Akyol, Deputy General Director, European Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ankara, 31 May 1996.
^Hans-Joachim Vergau, German Ambassador to Turkey, speech delivered at Bilkent University, 
Ankara, 11 April 1996.
war and "was not grounded in a generally accepted legitimacy, namely a system of 
common values and mles of behaviour", it was clearly "a-political"^.
Even though the motivations for a European unity can be assigned to a variety 
o f factors, it is certain that it was the United States which became a powerful 
protagonist for the cause of a united E u ro p e .E stab lish in g  a tight network of 
overlapping institutions was believed to be the best way to prevent the reemergence of 
German predominance on the continent and secure peace in Europe. Parallel to these 
security considerations, architects of world order identified a further goal of future 
development. Poltical stability was to arise out of economic strength.
The European Economic Community (EEC), founded through the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957 was comprised of six countries and can be seen as the successor of the 
European Community of Steel and Coal (ECSC) which was founded in 1951 and had 
proven to be an outstanding economic success. Steel production rose by 42 per cent 
and industrial production among the six increased more than twice as fast as in Britain 
(which had abstained from membership) between 1950 and 1955 and almost three 
times as fast between 1955 and 1960.1^
While economic development grew well under concerted European action, 
security matters could not be solved by the Europeans themselves. An attempt to set 
up a European Defense Community was bound to fail. Therefore, NATO became the 
striking security instrument and ensured the bonds between Europe and the United 
States. The new-born trans-Atlantic alliance emerged as a potent symbol for 
diminishing individual profiles that had formerly defined different positions. As the 
Cold War started to unfold during the 1950s smaller entities were no longer seen as 
the prime force in international politics and solidarity replaced individuality. By the 
same token, the relevant focus shifted and it can be argued that the variety of political
^GASTEYGER, Curt (1994): A World Restored? International Relations after the Cold War, in: 
WEIDENFELD, Werner and Josef Janning (eds.): Europe in Global Change. Strategies and Options 
for Europe: Gütersloh, 34.
^®DUIGNAN, Peter and Lawrence H. Gann (1992): The Rebirth o f the WesL The Americanization of 
the Democratic World 1945 - 1958; Oxford, 337.
^^LAQUEUR, Walter (1970): The Rebirth of Europe; London, 133.
institutions were intrinsically linked in such a way that the image of this network as a 
united Western front enjoyed much greater impact than the sum of its parts.
It is in this light that one has to consider Turkey's move to establish 
institutional links with the newly bom European Economic Community. Clearly, 
Turkey's application for associate membership in the EEC on 31 July 1959 can be 
largely attributed to Turkey's longstanding strive to "share a common destiny with the 
West"^2. Since the creation of the Republic in 1923, the Turkish leaders had followed 
an adamant policy of Westernization. Both domestic and foreign policy was directed 
towards this overriding goal. Consequently, Turkey applied to join almost all the 
instiutions that were created in the process of forging the Western alliance (Marshall 
Plan, the OEEC/OECD, the Council of Europe, NATO).
Even though close association with the Community suited Turkey's 
development in so far as investment capital from Western Europe would push 
modernisation, no Turkish study ever analysed the application for association with 
regard to its impact on Turkish economy.^^ Likewise, a closer look at Turkey's 
application reveals that "for many policy-makers in Turkey, the European Community 
was an unknown entity, and the implication of Turkey's membership had not been 
considered in depth''^^. While the EEC had come into being as a body of countries 
sharing particular economic interests, Turkish policy-makers equated joining the 
Community with an increase in political prestige. First and foremost, membership in 
the new European Community was a logical extension of Turkey's inclusion in other 
Western organizations.
The "Greek factor", however, ranks prominent among the incentives that 
drove Turkey to submit her application^^, an act often interpreted as a mere response
^^ILKIN, Selim (1990); A History of Turkey's Association with the European Community, in: 
EVIN, Ahmet and Geoffrey Denton (eds.): Turkey and the European Community; Opladen, 35. 
^^REDMOND, John (1993a): The next Mediterranean Enlargement; Dartmouth, 25.
^'^ERALP, Atila (1993a): Turkey and the EC in the changing post-war international system, in: 
BALKIR, Canan and Allan M. Williams (eds.): Turkey and Europe; London, 27.
^^STEINBACH, Udo (1996): Die Türkei im 20. Jahrhundert Schwieriger Partner Europas; Bergisch 
Gladbach, 233.
to a similar application made by Greece two months earlier.'^ Despite reasonably 
friendly relations, which lasted from 1930 when Greece recognized that the eastern 
Aegean seaboard was irrevocably lost, to 1955, when the Cyrus problem erupted in 
violence, Turkish foreign policy followed a standard conduct towards its neighbour 
which was based on the assumption of deep political and historical rivalry^^ between 
the two countries. It was feared that Greece's strong anti-Turkish attitude could 
influence European political platforms in a way which would disrupt Turkey's smooth 
rapprochement with the Western alliance.
Similarly, the positive response by the European Community was politically 
motivated, reflecting a growing concern for NATO's Southern pillar and the desire to 
balance its relations with the front-line states Turkey and Greece. The EEC which was 
itsself still in the making and could not predict its future course as a result decided for 
a marriage of convenience. Security considerations clearly ousted economic reflections 
in favour of Turkey's application. Moreover, the EEC had to give up its originally 
cautious conduct vis-à-vis Turkey. While the Europeans had envisaged to keep 
relations with Turkey at a minimum level and merely provide economic assistance and 
offer certain trade and tariff concessions that would support Turkey's economic 
development, the Turkish-Greek rivalry prompted the EEC to treat both as equal 
partners. Consequently, after having created a precedent by signing a treaty of 
association with Greece, the EEC had to offer a similar status to Turkey. The crucial 
element that distinguishes the association treaties with Greece and Turkey from those 
the Community signed with other countries such as Malta, Cyprus and even later with 
the Eastern European states in the 1990s is the fact that it foresees explicitly the 
possibility of an eventual full membership. Thus, both Turkey and Greece felt entitled
^^ERALP, Atila (1993b): Turkey and the European Community: Prospects for a New Relationship, 
in: ERALP, Atila, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yesilada (eds.): The Political and Socioeconomic 
Transformation of Turkey; Westport, 194.
^^for a comprehensive account of the perception of this relation see MANGO, Andrew (1994): 
Turkey. The challenge of a New Role; Washington, Chpt. 9 Philhellenes and Turcophiles.
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to be admitted automatically to the European Community and interpreted the clause as 
a legal right for future accession to the EC.
The circumstances under which Turkish-Eiux)pean rapprochement came about 
in the late 1950s can be seen as a presage for the limited common perspectives that 
would characterize the relations throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While the initial 
cause for Turkey’s application was entirely political and lacked a well-balanced 
assessment in its own right, Turkey's overall motivation nevertheless presents itself as 
a sum of "logeai consequences"^®. Even though Turkish policy-makers have always 
demonstrated their interest in maintaining a relationship as close as possible, they 
approached the EC on the basis of "vague feelings that EC association would confirm 
their European identity" The nature of this vocation européenne, however, could 
remain unquestioned only as long as the European Community would refrain from 
assuming its own dynamic. The general premise of an undifferentiated Western unity, 
on which Turkish perceptions of Europe were based, would have to adopt to a pixx;ess 
of rapid change and political integration in Europe, if Turkey really intended to follow 
through.
The European Community, on the other hand, avowedly acting out of 
security reasons when entering into a partnership with Turkey, never made it entirely 
clear, how intensive it wanted the alliance to be. Granting special status to Turkey 
within the framework of the association agreement, which included the "eventuality" 
of Turkish membership, reflects the European tendency to invest only as much as 
needed, but always as little as possible into the relationship. Without a fixed point of 
view vis-à-vis Turkey, the European attitude lacked the overwhelming enthusiasm that 
characterized the Turkish attitude vis-à-vis Europe. This discrepancy obviously led to
^®KRAMER. Heinz (1994); EC-Turkish Relations: Unfinished Forever?, in: LUDLOW, Peter (ed.): 
E u rc ^  and the Mediterranean; London, 194.
^^REDMOND, John (1993b): The European Community and the mediterranean Applicants; Turkey, 
Cyprus and Malta, in: PFETSCH, Frank R. (ed.): International Relations and Pan-Europe. Theoretical 
Approaches and Empirical Findings; Hamburg, 238.
the perception that the European Community seemed to be overtly concerned to avoid 
any steps that would set the shaky relationship in the direction towards irreversible 
integration.20 Besides, it cannot be ignored that between the original EEC-6 there was 
far from a consensus over either its future organisational shape or the timing of any 
developments.^!
In addition to other factors, events and shifting constellations that would 
prevail upon the intricate course of Turkish-European relations in the future, the 
incoherence in both Turkey’s and the EC's reasons for wanting an association 
agreement and the failure to fully comprehend what such a committment entailed, 
prevented a firuitful cooperation right at the beginning. Accordingly, the absence of 
congruent attitudes remained a constant source o f misperceptions that impeded the 
partnership as it started to unfold.
2.2. Building institutional links 
and a contractual framework
Turkish-European relations continued to embark upon several levels and an 
evaluation of the state of affairs embraces several domains. A review of the legal basis 
provides several clues which help to entangle the present situation. A sound analysis 
o f this framework is deemed helpful, because cooperation, understood in the first 
place as a process of policy coordination, depends in part on institutional 
arrangements. Above all, it has to be noted that "institutions shape expectations’’^ .^
a well-balanced evaluation of motives, interests and attitudes see KRAMER (1994), 191 - 202. 
^^O'NEILL, Michael (1996): The Poltics of European Integration; London, 6.
^^KEOHANE, Robert O. (1989): Neoliberal Institutionalism: A perspective on World Politics, in: 
KEOHANE, Robert O. (ed.): International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International 
Relations Theory: Boulder, 3.
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- The Ankara Agreement and Additional Protocol
Turkey and the EEC institutionalised their relation by signing an association 
agreement (Ankara Agreement) on 12 September 1963 which was supplemented and 
specified by an Additional Protocol of 1970 that came into effect on 1 January 1973. 
The contracts envisaged the progressive establishment of an extended customs union 
between Turkey and the Community, a process to be realised in three stages over a 
period of twenty-two years at maximum. In order to strengthen the commercial and 
economic relations between the parties, the agreements entailed the obligation for both 
parties to gradually reduce the customs duties and for Turkey to adopt the common 
external tariff of the Community vis-à-vis third countries. Apart from the fact that of 
all the agreements the EC/EU has signed with third countries over time, only the 
association treaty signed with Cyprus in 1973 entails the establishment of a mutual 
customs union as weU^ ,^ the nature of association as planned in the Ankara Agreement 
and the Additional Protocol was unique in several ways.
Above all, the contracts encompassed several stages that call for an economic 
integration which extends the framework of a normal customs union^^. During a 
preparatory stage the Community alone was to make commercial concessions and 
provide financial aid, in order to strengthen Turkish economy. It involved the 
introduction of tariff quotas (quotas indicating quantities of goods which can be 
imported at a reduced rate) for Turkey's principal agricultural products which together 
accounted for 40 per cent of Turkish exports and the provision of ECU 175 million of 
loans to assist Turkey's development.
The second stage was to be a transitional period with the aim of gradually 
introducing a customs union proper. This period would involve the adoption of
23see VANER, Semih (1996): Zyperns Aufnahme in die Europäische Gemeinschaft, in: Europäische 
Rundschau (Wien), Vol.24, No.2,47 - 58.
2^the contractual aspects are summarized according to ILKIN (1990), 37 - 
45 and BOURGUIGNON, Roswitha (1990): The History of the Association Agreement between 
Turkey and the European Community, in: EVIN, Ahmet and Geoffrey Denton (eds.): Turkey and the 
European Community; Opladen, 51 - 63.
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customs union to be established under the stipulations "comes fairly close to the 
establishment of a common market between the EC and Turkey. "26
The extent of the customs union alone could betaken as an indication that the 
relationship was not intended to stop here. In accordance with the association 
agreement signed with Greece two years earlier, howevîr, the European Community, 
in Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement, also conceded the possibility of a later Turkish 
entry into the Community. Though, this clause was rot meant to grant automatic 
accession, since full membership would depend on conaete conditions being achieved 
and would naturally entail the examination of Turkey’s political will and power to 
accept both the acquis communautaire and the ftnaliié politique of the European 
Community. On the other hand, the concession of the option to enter shows that the 
European Community viewed Turkey politically as being a "European country". This 
interpretation could be derived from Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty of the 
EEC, 1958) which states that only European countries are entitled to apply for 
membership. Moreover, at the time of the signature of the Agreement, Walter 
Hallstein, then President of the Commission, actually declared that "Turkey is part of
Europe"27.
Even though Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement clearly states that full 
membership would not be yielded unconditionally, Turkish views repeatedly 
emphasized their special status and expressed high expectations that the change of 
position from one vis-à-vis to one within the European Community would be a 
question of time. The issue of full membership and the question o f reciprocal 
responsibilities and obligations the partners associate with this specific proposition 
remained a permanent matter of contention.
26k RAMER, Heinz (1996): Turkey and the European Union: A Multi-Dimensional Relationship 
with Hazy Perspectives, in: MASTNY, Vojtech and R. Craig Nation [eds.): Turkey between East and 
West. New Challenges f«· a Rising Regional Power, Boulder, 205.
27REDMOND (1993a). 23.
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common internal and external tariffs and arrangements that would bring about general 
economic policy alignment. The Community was to eliminate custom tariffs on 
imports of industrial products from Turkey at once, while Turkey had to remove 
tariffs in stages over several years depending on the kinds of products. A second 
financial protocol was to assign loans of up to ECU 300 million to ease the hardships 
of increased economic competition.
The final stage would entail intensification o f coordination of economic 
policies. While Turkey would reach the final stage within a period of twenty-two years 
at maximum, the Agreement did not fix a time limit for the final stage which would 
precede further integration.
In addition to the trade agreements, the accords included the principles of 
freedom of setdement for professions, freedom to provide services, free movement of 
workers, stipulations about the harmonization of tax systems, rules of competition and 
other economic legal regulations. With the inclusion of three of the "four freedoms" as 
laid down in the Treaty of the EEC it becomes fairly obvious that EC-Turkey relations 
would become stronger than necessary to ensure the proper functioning of a customs 
union. Since also future free trade in the agricultural sector was included in the 
Additional Protocol, Turkey was set to participate in all policy-sectors that were 
contractually fixed in the Treaty of Rome as subject of common politics of the 
European Economic Community. In this perspective, the vision of Turkey's proximity 
and the perspective of possible future accession to the EEC gains particular 
credibility.25
While provisions relating to the creation of a customs union were displayed 
rather clearly, the precise timing for the introduction of free labour movement and the 
exact nature of economic policy-coordination remained relatively vague. Nevertheless, 
both contracts taken together represent an extensive agreement. Thus, the sort of
^ s e e  KRAMER, Heinz (1995); Die Assoziierungsabkommen der EU: Die Türkei und Mittelosteuropa 
in einem Boot?, Reihe Eurokolleg, Nr. 32, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; Bonn, 4.
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2.3. Approaches and Attitudes:
Difficulties of implementation as a result of rising 
politicization in the 1970s and 1980s
As was the case with her application for associate membership, Turkey’s call 
in 1967 to enter the second (transitional) stage of the Ankara Agreement arose 
predominantly out of political motivations. While Turkey's trade deficit with the EC 
was growing, no comprehensive study had been made to measure the economic 
impact o f the association and with increasing domestic disputes whether the national 
development policy and Turkey’s overall foreign policy goals would match (the five- 
year development plans of this period virtually contradicted the stipulations of the 
Ankara Agreement), Turkey was economically unprepared to enter a further phase. 
Yet, Turkey hoped for better terms from the Community following the military 
takeover in Greece. Moreover, deepening the relations with the EC was deemed 
desirable as the Cyprus crisis (1963-67) had troubled the solid partnership with the 
United States.28
- Failures and Misperceptions in the 1970s
Even though the Community was initially cautious to enter a second phase of 
the association, it readily conceded that it was unrealistic to expect that the measures 
taken in the prepatory stage could have been sufficient With the Additional Protocol 
coming into effect in 1973, the Community eliminated customs duties at once, thereby 
opening its market to nearly all Turkish goods, with the exception of agricultural 
products and textiles, which at the beginning of the 1970s still made up the main part 
of the Turkish export trade.
While until the 1970s relations with the EEC were conceived of in terms of 
foreign policy and excluded the consideration of issues related to development
^STEARNS, Monteagle (1992): Entangled Allies. U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; 
New York, 33 - 37.
14
strategies, the Turkish policy-makers from now on started to become aware of the 
possible negative impact of EEC membership on Turkish industrialisation.29 Turkey's 
principle actors in the game, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Planning 
Organisation heavily disagreed on how to proceed further^® While the former argued 
for the primacy of political rather than economic considerations, the latter emphasized 
the detrimental effects of rapid implementations of the agreements with the EEC. 
Thus, one could witness the "emergence o f a tension between two of Turkey's basic 
national projects. Westernization and development, which had hitherto seemed quite 
compatible. "3·
Growing concerns about the country's future course also reflected on the 
domestic political and economic situation. A series of weak coalition governments, 
increasing political polarization and rapid economic deterioration^^ curbed Turkey's 
foreign policy flexibility. Economically squeezed by the oil crisis in 1973, Turkey was 
unable to keep her obligations in the stepwise reduction of its customs duties, so that 
in 1978 the Turkish government officially requested a five-year freeze in Turkey's 
committments.
Even though the gradual establishment of a customs union between the two 
partners had thus far been a "one-way-street", as Turkey had effected only a negligible 
reduction of custom duties for EC products and had not begun at all to adjust to the EC 
external tariff, the Community did not prove to be accomodating towards Turkey 
either. The strong restriction on Turkish agricultural products and textiles aroused 
suspicion among Turks that "the Community's policy seemed quite hypocritical, in 
that it was prepared to allow free entry for all industrial products except those in which 
Turkey was fully competetive."33 Likewise, the European Community did its utmost
^^R A L P , Atila (1990): The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies, in: FINKEL, Andrew and 
Nükhet Sirmen (eds.): Turkish Society, Turkish State; London, 245.
3®for a detailed account on this domestic policy-debate see ILKIN (1990), 40 - 44.
3İERALP (1993a), 245.
32The decade of internal crisis is well accounted for in: AHMAD, Feroz (1993): The Making of 
Modem Turkey; London, 148 - 180.
33REDMOND (1993a), 29.
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to prevent the realization of the terms of the Association Agreement and the Additional 
Protocol which had foreseen that free movement of workers was to be brought about 
between 1976 and 1986. This would have relieved the pressure off Turkey's labour 
market and secured a certain inflow of foreign exchange in the form of guest-worker 
remittances. When the German government in 1973 issued a ban on the recruitment of 
guest-workers from non-EC countries that was followed suit by other member states, 
it clearly violated the stipulations both parties had signed under the legal framework.^ 
Above all, the European repudiation of several stipulations hit Turkey at a 
period when the country had to cope with unprecedented domestic political and 
economic decay and inevitably had to freeze the agreements, in order to mitigate these 
internal pressures. The fateful decision to temporarily dissociate from Europe gains a 
particular dimension in light of the fact that this move was paralleled by another 
equally consequential departure from Turkey's standard conduct of foreign policy, as 
the Greek application for full membership to the EC in 1975 was quietly tolerated. 
Preoccupied with events on the home front, the Turkish decision-making elite paid 
scant attention to this move and "few, if any, carefully considered the effect of Greek 
membership on Turkey's chances to follow suit"35. Deviating from her usual complex 
de mmetisme^^, Turkey would later become aware of the bitter practical repercussions 
arising from Greece's instrumentalization of its position as a member o f the 
Community.^’
3^KR.AMER (1994), 209 - 210.
35ERALP (1993b), 199.
^^KUSHNER, David (1994): Turkey and Europe: A Relationship of Passion and Pain, in: History of 
European Ideas, Vol.18, No.5,688.
^^Turkey reacted only in February 1980, after Greece had signed the treaty of accession and announced 
that a formal application would be forwarded by autumn. The military intervention, however, 
prevented this move. On this point see: MÜFTÜLER, Meltem (1993): Turkey and the Eurr^)ean 
Community. An uneasy relationship, in: Turkish Review. A Quarterly Digest, Vol.7, No.33, Fall 
1993, 38.
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- The standstill o f relations in the 1980s
Subsequent efforts to side Turkey in face of her economic difficulties after the 
freeze of the agreement in 1978, amounted to the Community's offer in 1979 to make 
available a fourth financial protocol which was regarded inadequate by Turkey. While 
the partnership seemed to pursue a course of steady decline towards the end of the 
1970s, EC-Turkey relations experienced a sudden, but short relance after Turkey had 
announced a drastic change of course of its economic policy. A radical break with the 
tradition of etatism was to introduce a new liberal system based on the principles of 
free market economy.38
While at first glance this act could be understood as a decisive step taken up 
by the Europeans, a closer look suggests that once again external factors had prompted 
the EC’s reconsideration of coming to terms with Turkey. The Community’s decision 
to revive relations in 1980 was chiefly based on a confidential report by the EC’s 
external relations commissioner William Haferkamp, "stressing the need for additional 
economic aid to Turkey after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the revolution 
in Iran.’’39 The Community’s interest in stabilising Turkey and "giving Turkey the 
feeling that it belongs to the European family and has privileged relations with the 
Community"'*® was thus mainly motivated by strategic reasons. Europeans followed a 
similar move by the United States which lifted the arms embargo which had been in 
force because of the Cyprus issue from 1974 until 1978.'** The US-Turkish 
rapprochement led to enhanced cooperation and American assistance to Turkey 
quadrupled between 1978 and 1981.'*^
Despite these moves, it became evident that geopolitical considerations would 
cease to tip the scales in favour of uncontested European support for Turkey.
^®STEINBACH, Udo (1988): Die Türkei sieht in der Dritten Republik, in: Aussenpolitik, Vol.?, 
No.2, 246 - 247.
^^BOURGUIGNON (1990), 57.
'*®report quoted according to BOURGUIGNON (1990), 58, my italics.
'**CAMPANY, Richard C.(1987): Turkey and the United States: The Arms Embargo Period; New 
York.
'*2e RALP (1993a), 32.
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Although a fourth financial protocol was ratified in June 1981 as a result of the short 
relance initiated a year earlier, the military intervention of September 1980 had a 
lasting impact on Turkish-European relations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe was the first European institution to take immediate action 
following the general’s coup and subsequently suspended Turkey’s membership and 
refused to invite Turkish parliamentarians to its sessions. When the National Security 
Council as the representative body of the military announced the dissolution of all 
political parties in October 1981, the European Community decided to delay the 
implementation of the Fourth Financial Protocol, ratified a few months earlier. In line 
with these actions the European Parliament adopted a resolution in January 1982 and 
suspended the EC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee.'*^ With no appointments for 
a further meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council in sight, institutional links 
between the Community and Turkey were virtually cut and the relations went through 
a depression whose long-lasting effects have survived the period of actual stillstand.
The firm standpoint taken against the development of the domestic political 
situation in Turkey clearly reflects that the EC had obtained a position within the 
Western alliance that allowed the Community and its members to distinguish between 
the obligations strictly connected with NATO and other orientations arising from 
specific contingencies.*^ Naturally, the EC would base its assessment of trouble spots 
and the role and importance of stability assigned to these regions on its own particular 
interests and values. Thus, the 1970s and 1980s displayed the rising gap between US 
and European Foreign Policy and the obvious trend of increasing differentiation within 
the framework of the Western alliance. Notwithstanding continuous rivalry between 
the member states of the EC, one could observe the attempt to coordinate concerted 
European foreign policy decisions, sometimes clearly in opposition to US-sponsored *
**3e r ALP (1993b), 200 - 201.
1968, e.g. the Council of Europe forced Greece to resign its membership as a result of human 
rights practices of the military junta, while the Unites States lobbied against the move, arguing that it 
would undermine the unity of NATO, see: SIKKINK, Kathryn (1993): The Power of Principled Ideas: 
Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in: GOLDSTEIN, Judith and Robert 
O. Keohane (eds.): Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change; Ithaca, 158.
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initiatives. As a result of the European Political Cooperation (EPC)‘*5, e.g., the EC 
foreign ministers in September 1973 had declared their neutrality in the Middle East 
conflict, thereby obviously deviating from the US-policy.'*^
Likewise, Turkey could no longer count on US and European foreign 
policies to approach her in the same fashion. While EC-Turkey relations came to a 
grinding halt following the military takeover, the United States affirmed its solidarity 
with Turkey amounting to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and a visit 
of Secretary of State Alexander Haig to Ankara in 1982, describing US-Turkish 
relations as "excellent".^^ When the US financial assistance to Turkey reached an all 
time peak in 1985'**, relations between the European Conununity and Turkey were 
still waiting to be restored.
When the EC-Turkey Association Council met for the first time in six years in 
September 1986'*^, in order to resolve the deadlock of the freedom-of-movement 
question, which according to the Ankara Agreement was to be realized by 1986, the 
European Community had changed its face significantly. The original EEC had 
enlarged to a Community of twelve, after the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
(1973), Greece (1981) and Portugal and Spain (1986) had joined the Community. By 
the same token, the Community had undertaken a significant qualitative jump by 
signing the Single European Act (SEA) which set the timetable for the realization of a 
Common Market by 1992.
Among other institutional changes, the SEA came to place increasing weight 
to the European Parliament. Its new right of co-determination with regard to the 
accession of new members gained particular importance for EC-Turkey relations.
'*^see HOLLAND, Martin (1991) (ed.): The future of European Political Cooperation. Essays on 
Theory and Practice; Houndmills and NUTTALL, Simon J. (1992): European Political Cooperation; 
Oxford.
'*^DE SANTIS, Hugh (1990): The Reshaping of Europe, A RAND Note, Pepared for the Defense 
Advisory Group Under Seaetary of Defense for Policy, N-3402-DAGAJSDP; Santa Monica, 
'*^SEZER; Duygu Bazoglu (1993): Turkey and the Western Alliance in the 1980s, in: ERALP, Atila 
and Murhancm Tiinay (eds.): The Political and Socio-Economic Transformation of Turkey; Westport, 
221.
'**EARLP (1993a), 34.
'*9b OUGUIGNON (1990), 60.
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Despite the fact that between the military coup in September 1980 and June 1985, the 
European Parliament had tabled no fewer than 20 motions for resolution expressing 
concern about the human rights situation in Turkey and had passed 11 of these^®, 
Turkish policy-makers continuously underestimated the significance of the European 
Parliament as a new actor that would have a crucial say in the question of Turkey's 
stand towards the EC. From now on being vested with the right to co-determine the 
suitability of future candidates for accession to the EC, the European Parliament in line 
with the Council of Europe adopted an adament position towards Turkey and put 
under close scrutiny the process of démocratisation.^!
Turkish policy-makers and public opinion have often dismissed the EP’s 
actions and condemned their resolutions as unjustified attempts to interfere in domestic 
affairs. Even though the vehemence and continuity of criticism expressed in the 
various resolutions o f the EP stand out, "the inability of Turkish policy-makers to 
assess correctly the importance placed by Europe on the question of democracy"^^ has 
not constituted a feasible strategy for Turkey's accession plans. While the European 
Parliament's harsh critique continued to figure prominently in the Turkish perception 
of Europe, it seems important to note that the EP did not constitute a coherent entity 
either. Showing understanding for the Turkish case against the somewhat distorted 
and one-sided point of view the European Parliament had adopted, Kai-Uwe Hassel, 
Member of the conservative faction in the EP, in 1984 emphasized the detrimental 
effects of the EP's "foolish superior attitude and moral-democratic arrogance"^^.
SOr e MOND (1993a), 60.
^^for a detailed account of European pressure on the military regime see: DAGI, Ihsan D. (1996): 
Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: The Impact of European Diplomacy, in: Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol.32, No.2, April 1996, Special Issue Turkey, 124 - 141,
52ERALP (1993a), 32.
53quoted in: KRAMER, Heinz (1988): Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei. Entwicklung, 
Probleme und Perspektiven einer schwierigen Partnerschaft; Baden-Baden, 105.
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The Turkish application for full membership reached the EC only two months 
after the Turkey-EC Joint Pariamentary Committee had been reestablished. However, 
the Committee did not begin to resume its work until 1989.^4
2.4. Turkey's application for full membership
Even though Turkey witnessed the restoration of competitive politics in 
1983^5, the EC's criticism of Turkey's standard of democracy and human rights did 
not disappear; EC, instead, continued to demand a deepening of the process of 
pluralization, which the first free elections had not automatically sat in motion.^^ The 
impression that the association had seemingly reached an impasse was furthered by the 
recurrent Greek veto blocking financial aid and the reactivation of the Association 
Council meetings. Apart from the apparent political alienation that had prevented the 
resumption of the relations, Turkey's political and economic elite became convinced 
that a mere association with the EC would no longer serve Turkey's interests. Full 
membership became the prime target, because the new export-oriented economic 
policy reduced the importance of the customs union issue for industrialists and instead 
stressed the question o f foreign investment.^^ Besides, in order to compete 
successfully with the EC's new members like Spain and Portugal whose export
^YALCINTAS, Nevzat (1990): Turkey and the European Community, in: KÖRNER, Heiko and 
Rasul Shams (eds.): Institutional Aspects of Economic Integration of Turkey into the European 
Community; Hamburg, 161.
^^The first free elections, however, excluded key pre-1980 political figures who were not allowed to 
participate, see: HEPER, Metin (1992): Consolidating Turkish Democracy, in: Journal of Democracy, 
Vol.3, N o .2 ,114.
^%VIN, Ahmet (1994): Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime, in HEPER, Metin and 
Ahmet Evin (eds.): Politics in the Third Turkish Republic; Boulder, 23 - 39.
^^Balkir, Caran (1993): Turkey and the European Community: Foreign trade and direct foreign 
investment in the 1980s, in: BALKIR, Canan and Allan M. Williams (eds.): Turkey and Europe; 
Londott/NewYork, 100-139.
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portfolios resembled her own, Turkey would need to obtain access to the financial 
benefits that membership would provide.^*
Furthermore, Turkish exports to the Middle East diminished and relations 
with the United States did not develop beyond the security partnership, as Washington 
did not send any signals that it would tie military aid to concessions concerning the 
opening of its own markets. The increasing instability in the region as a result o f the 
Iran-Iraq war suggested that the relations with the arabic-Islamic neighbourhood did 
not rest on a stable basis and therefore could not be seen as a viable alternative to the 
European option.^^
In addition to all these external factors. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal who had 
steered the country on a steady, but not undisputed course towards liberal economy 
was facing heavy internal pressure and criticism, resulting from the continuous 
inflation the government was unable to control. Yet, Ozal's unique leadership 
personality^® led him to believe that he had carved out a new place for Turkey after 
almost a decade of isolation. He was also convinced that "he was determined to 
become the one Turkish politician after Atatürk who actually anchored his country in 
Europe"^ ^
Even though impressive figures of economic growth in the 1980s (around 7 
percent) fostered confidence among the new Turkish leadership that the European 
Community would acknowledge Turkey’s potential to achieve European economic 
standards, the application for full membership submitted on 14 April 1987 was 
received with great surprise in Brussels and the member states. Given the frustrating 
experiences of the implementation of the Ankara Agreement and the prevailing 
skepticism and doubt concerning the state of Turkish democracy, "Turkey’s effort to
the link between enlargement and subsequent trade diversion effect on Turkey see: MÜFTÜLER, 
Meltem (1995): Turkish Economic Liberalization and European Integrationen: Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol.31. No.2, 86 - 87.
^®on Turkey’s attempts during the 1980s to look for new poltical and economic partners in the Middle 
East see: ERALP (1993b), 203 - 205.
^ fo r  a characterization of Özal's style of doing politics see: ABRAMOWITZ, Morton (1993): 
Dateline Ankara: Turicey after Özal, in: Foreign Policy, No.91, Summer 1993,164 -181. 
6İRRAMER (1996), 209.
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become a full member of the EC was tantamount to undoing the Gordian knot"^2. 
More often than once, observers have pointed out the crucial timing mistake of 
Turkey's application, presented much later than those of the last three members of the 
EC and especially after Greece: "The reason is that the economic differences between 
Turkey and those three countries were less important at that time than now and the 
Community would have been obliged to accept or reject the whole of the full 
membership requests.
The European Community which had advised Turkish politicians repeatedly 
that an application would not be feasible, found itself in a difficult position. While the 
EC intended only to revive the association, Greece's constant blocking of the fourth 
financial protocol and the obvious impossibility to realize the freedom of movement 
had manoeuvred the Europeans in a difficult position, since they had no constructive 
contribution to offer.
As the Commission was still busy to examine the application, its President 
Jacques Delors declared that no new round of enlargement were to be considered 
before the common market would be finalized by 1992. This point of view showed the 
general consensus among all political forces in the Community who expressed their 
preferences in favour of consolidation and deepening of the integration as opposed to 
an enlargement In order to avoid a repetition of the "Eurosclerosis" that had plagued 
the Community between 1965 and 1985, its members were now determined to fulfill 
the stipulations agreed upon in the Single European Act. Evidently, they would not 
consider a new round of enlargement at this point of time. The specific situation the 
EC encountered underlines that Turkey had chosen an unfortunate time to apply. 
However, it brought to the forefront the importance to realize the "twin test" any 
country must pass to be considered a potentially successful candidate for accession.
^^STEINBACH, Udo (1994): The European Community, the United States, the Middle East, and 
Turkey, in: HEPER, Metin and Ahmet Evin (eds.): Politics in the Third Turkish Republic; Boulder, 
109.
^^OZKALE,Lerzan (1992): International Competetiveness of Tuikey and the Problem of EC Entry. 
Working Paper, Fricdrich-Ebert-Vakfi; Istanbul, 32.
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Thus, not just the evaluation of the effects of entry on the applying country itsself, but 
also the effects of entry on the European Community concerning its proper functioning 
guided the EC in formulating its point of view.^
With regard to Turkey, the Commission’s Opinion issued in December 
198965 reflected both aspects, but provided several remarks directed at Turkey in 
particular. The content did not come as a surprise to anyone. As expected, the 
Commission declined to open negotiations for full membership and deferred the 
application until 1993 at the earliest. The main arguments presented against Turkish 
membership read as follows:
* Turkey's low level of economic development by EC standards (almost half the per 
capita gross domestic product of the EC's poorest countries, despite rising growth 
rates averaging over 5 percent throughout the 1980s, well above EC norms)
* its high rate of population growth (roughly 2.5 percent annually, ten times the EC 
average) with the prospect of 70 million Turks by the end of the century, compared to 
a population of some 330 million in an EC of its current size
* long-term foreign debt of 38 billion dollars, the world's seventh highest
* low tax revenue and high state expenditure (over twice the EC average)
* a state-owned sector accounting for 40 percent of manufacturing output, despite 
Ozal's privatization campaign.
From these socio-economic difficulties, the Commission concluded: "As long 
as these disparities continue to exist, there will be reason to fear that Turkey would 
experience serious difficulties in taking the obligations resulting from the 
Community's economic and social politics."^^
^CENDROWICZ, Michael (1992): The European Community and Turkey. Looking Backwards, 
Looking Forwards, in: DODD, Clement (ed.): Turkish Foreign Policy. New Prospects. Modem 
Turkish Studies Programme, School of CWental and African Studies, Occasional Papers, No.2,20. 
^^Commission of the European Communities (1989): Commission Opinion on Turkey’s request for 
accession to the Community; Brussels, 20 December 1989, SEC (89) 2290 final.
^^Commission of the European Communities (1989): The Turkish Economy: Structure and 
Developments: Brussels, 18 December 1989, SEC (89) 2290 final. Annex)
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In addition to the economic obstacles, the Commission also voiced 
adjustment constraints of exclusively political nature. After conceding that, since 
1980, there has been significant progress towards the creation of an acceptable 
parliamentary democracy, it mentioned the need to further expand political pluralism, 
the ability to sustain the improvement of human rights and the rights o f minorities. 
Moreover, the persistence o f disputes with "one member state and the lack of a 
solution granting the territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with the United 
Nations resolutions"^^ were mentioned.
In its conclusion the Commission emphasized the necessity to continue its 
cooperation with Turkey and suggested that a variety of substantial measures were to 
be introduced that would strengthen the mutual integration. In order to achieve this, 
the Commission suggested that the customs union were to be completed, the financial 
cooperation to be revived and intensified, the technical and industrial cooperation to be 
improved and the political and cultural links to be strengthened. Even though the 
Commission confirmed the validity of Article 28 of the Ankara Agreement concerning 
the future possibility of Turkey's full membership in the European Community, the 
opinion nevertheless clearly expressed that Turkey’s 1987 application was 
disapproved of.
The EC's negative reply was greeted by both the Turkish elite and the public 
at large with "deep disappointment and resentment"^^ and created a sense of 
"disillusionment and rejection"^^. This was mainly due to the remarkable degree of 
consensus achieved within Turkey concerning the desirability of EC membership. 
Moreover, Turkey's request for accession was tied to high expectations and had 
become a strorgly emotional issue, not least stimulated by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal 
who emphasized the EC's moral obligation to accept Turkey as a full member. In his
^^Commission Opinion, point 9.
^O N IS, Ziya (1995): Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity, in: Middle East 
Journal, Vol.49, No.l, Winter 1995, 53.
^^SAYARI, Sabri(1992): Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf 
Crisis, in: Middle East Journal, Vol.46, No.l, Winter 1995,12.
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book "La Turquie en Europe", Ôzal pointed out that the EC "pourra exercer une 
vigilance capable d'empêcher tout réapparition des sentiment archaiques qui 
sommeillent en elle"^®.
What Turks felt most disappointed about was the way the negative reply was 
presented. A careful reading of the opinion revealed the EC's tendency to develop a 
preferential consideration for the Eastern European countries which witnessed 
dramatic political changes at the time. The opinion states that "unless special 
circum stances"^ 1 occurred, the EC would not consider any discussion about 
enlargement prior to 1993 and would therefore defer Turkey's application. The fact 
that Poland and Hungary were immediately granted financial support of 600 Million 
ECU in 1989 after the process towards political reform was launched, made Turks feel 
that they did not receive a fair and appropriate consideration. Academics and 
politicians alike shared the opinion that "Turkey should interpret the European attitude 
as a rejection" 2^ jn case her application procedure had not been started before those of 
other states. Likewise, commentators in the political and the academic spectrum raised 
the question whether the Community showed any signs of actively participating in the 
process of Turkish development or whether their stand towards Turkey would be 
guided merely by their own interest.
The Commission's suggestions for strenghtening the association were not 
well-received in Turkey either. It was pointed out that the measures suggested 
represented no more than the aims already laid down in the Ankara Agreement and the 
Additional Protocol. All in all, the Community's negatve reply aroused suspicion on 
the Turkish side that the EC was following a "strategy of hide and seek instead of 
discussing the political motivation of the rejection"'^ .^
^®021AL, Turgut (1988): La Turquie en Europe; Paris, 220.
^^Commission Opinion, point 4.
^^TASilAN, Seyfi (1988): Turkey's alternatives and the EC, in: MANİSALI, Etol (ed.): Turkey's 
place in Europe. Economic, political and cultural dimensions; Gime/Ankara, 62.
'^GÜMRÜKÇÜ, Harun (1990): Die Stellungnahme der EG-Kommission zum Antrag der Türkei auf 
Beitritt zur Gemeinschaft, in: NORD-SÜD aktuell, Vol.4, N o.2,250.
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.2.5. An interim Balance: Limited common perspectives
The above analysis has shown that there are a variety of factors which inflict 
upon Turkish-European relatns. While this study as a whole has set itself the task to 
disentangle the complex interdependence of the various factors, this chapter has 
provided methodologically relevant information. By carefully selecting and 
contextualizing the available data it has contributed to the satisfactory explanation of 
events in so far, as it has located the relevant factors according to the three dimensions 
of analysis of international politics.
The subsequent interim results of this chapter may be summarized as follows:
* A review of the inter-actor level of the relation has shown that both sides have failed 
"to develop a clear agenda of mutual concerns"^'*. This can be attributed largely to the 
different motivations and attitudes both actors had assigned to the relation as it came 
into being. As a result, the legal framework which is to underpin the stability of the 
relation lacks both coherence and clarity. Instead, its conceptual ambivalence serves as 
a source o f constant misunderstanding. Apparently, mutual interest can be seen as a 
variable rather than a constant. As one student of intstitutionalism has pointed out: 
"Cooperation is possible, but depends in part on institutional arrangements."^^
* A  review of the intra-societal/actor level has disclosed the impact the internal 
dynamics have taken on the relation. The rapid processes of change have resulted in an 
increasing differentiation of the "actors" themselves. Therefore, it sheds light on the 
difficulty to assess Turkey-EC relations on the assumption of coherent entities.
The European dynamic can be evaluated in terms of deepening and widening 
o f the Community. The deepening of the Community has caused an increasing 
emphasis on political assessments such as human rights and democracy as the 
European Parliament has gained power within the EC firamework. The widening of the
thesis is widely agreed upon in most academic studies, see explicitely EVIN, Ahmet (1990): 
Introduction, in: EVIN, Ahmet and Geoffrey Denton (eds.): Turkey and the Eurq>ean Community; 
Opladen, 9.
■^^KEOHANE (1989), 3.
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EC has made an impact on the relations both in political and economic terms. 
Politically, the enlargement and subsequent inclusion of Greece has caused a constant 
blocking of implementing contractual arrangements. Economically, the accession of 
Spain and Portugal has caused considerable trade diversion effects for Turkey which 
consequently had to change her strategy in favour of direct application for full 
membership.
Internal dynamics in Turkey can be accounted for mainly in terms of rising 
disagreements about the compatability of Turkey's basic national projects. 
Westernization and development. This conflict did not facilitate the rational 
implementation of the institutional arrangements, as economic development became 
subject to constant intra-societal debate. Furthermore, the process of societal 
emancipation and rapid social change has not resulted in a smooth introduction of 
competetive politics. Interrupted by a series of military interventions, the 
démocratisation of the Turkish polity witnessed several stages. Subsequent attempts to 
moderate societal cleavages by means of depoliticization have sustained lasting 
damages with regard to the external perception of the Turkish self-conception of 
democracy. While the procedural functioning o f the parliamentary system could be 
ensured, Turkish democracy in the 1990s was still waiting to be fully consolidated.”^^
* A review of the conditions and effects of the international system on the relation has 
revealed two things. The immediate post-World War II developments caused 
ideological bloc formations which allowed for only exclusion or inclusion in one of 
the camps. The evolution of a closely united Europe, however, displayed an 
increasing tendency of differentiation within the Western alliance which resulted in 
temporary strategy changes. As the EC's reply to Turkey's application was not yet 
guided by the revolutionary systematic changes that took place in line with the events 
of 1989-90, the devotion to build a new European architecture in the 1990s promises 
to take greater impact on the relations and will have to be granted a considerable
^^OZBUDUN, Ergun (1996): Turkey: How far from consolidation?, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol.7, 
No.3,July 1996, 123 - 138.
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amount of attention as the relations continue to take their course. Turkey's new 
geopolitical position within the new European architecture will depend largely on the 
question whether threat preceptions will continue to function as a stable basis of 
security and defense arrangements.
29
3. The Customs Union Agreement as a 
bilateral negotiation process.
- An institutionalist analysis -
After the relations had reached a low point with the rejection of the Turkish 
application for full membership in 1989, it took until 1992, before both partners 
agreed on a new attempt to revive their relationship by following part of the 
stipulations of the Ankara Agreement and finalize the Customs Union.
M aintaining that sustained cooperation depends largely on the 
institutionalization of relations, the following chapter will analyse the political and 
economic effects that result directly out of the institutional arrangements of the 
Customs Union Agreement. Even though the CUA has laid down a coherent set of 
rules that can serve as a focal point of policy coordination, the analysis comes to the 
conclusion that the arrangement presents an unequal balance of obligations and rights.
It will then be tried to put under close scrutiny the interests of both the 
European Union and Turkey for wanting a customs union to come into being. By 
doing so it is attempted to reveal why the CUA came into effect despite the apparent 
lack of mutual interests.
3.1. New Attempts of Rapprochement in the 1990s
Immediately after the opening of the "iron curtain", the strategic value of 
Turkey as a corner-stone of the Western security and defense system had seemed to 
vanish, as no east-west confrontation was to be taken into consideration. This greatly 
influenced the evaluation of Turkey’s geopolitical position, which as of yet had always 
enjoyed prime importance for the Western Alliance.^^ Security considerations have 
always taken a prominent place on the European Union's foreign policy agenda, and 
even in times of conflicting interests served as a catalyst for Turkey-EC relations. After 
periods of standstill, relancing the relations was always due to such European threat
^^SEZER, Duygu Bazoglu (1992): Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma, in: The International 
Spectator, Vol.27, No.l, January - March 1992,17 - 32.
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perceptions. While the EU lacked a clear policy towards Turkey, the only arguments 
that overwhelmingly supported the case for a close relationship concerned strategic 
issues, Turkey's "strategic ace"^*, as the Commission called iL
It was due to this factor, that Turicey-EU relations witnessed another revival. 
While the European security environment underwent significant changes, the disorder 
in the Soviet successor states in Central Asia and in particular the second Gulf War 
against Iraq all of a sudden reestablished Turkey's standing.”^® With new threat 
perceptions in mind, the European Community found it necessary to reactivate its 
relations with Turkey. At its meeting in Lisbon in June 1992, the European Council, 
the bi-annual summit meeting of the EC's heads of state and government emphasized 
that the "Turkish role in the present European political situation is of the greatest 
importance"*·^.
The European Council's point of view was supported by the European 
Parliament. In a lengthy resolution on Turkey-EC relations^* the EP expressed its 
positive point o f view vis-à-vis Turkey and suggested that the relations with Turkey 
"must be urgently examined and improved." The resolution underlined once more 
Turkey's strategic importance for sustaining peace and a balance of power in the 
Middle East and in Central Asia. Furthermore, the EP expressed the opinion that the 
European Union needed to examine its relations with Turkey within the framework of 
the newly designed European continent. The EP emphasized, however, that Turkey 
did not fulfill the necessary political pre-requisites for accession into the European 
Union. Thus, it suggested to redefine the relations by reviving the Association 
Agreement. Within this framework the EP would support all initiatives directed at 
strengthening the political dialogue on all levels.
^«REDMOND (1993a), 44,
^^O B IN S, Philip (1992): Turkish Foreign Policy and the Gulf Crisis, in: DODD, Clement (ed.): 
Turkish Foreign Policy. New Prospects. Modem Turkish Studies Programme, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, Occasional Papers, No.20; Huntington, 70 - 87.
8<>KRAMER (1994), 210.
EUROPÄISCHES PARLAMENT(1992): Entschließung zu den Beziehungen zwischen der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft und der Türkei, A3-0193/92,19 November 1992, in: Amtsblatt der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nr. C 337, S. 218 - 225.
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3.2. Redefining the "Special Relationship"
The redefinition of the framework of relations became necessary, because 
Turkey had deliberately based her application for accession on Article 237 of the 
Treaty of Rome, which offers every European country the possibility of applying for 
membership. By doing so, Turkey had adopted a position of "self-detachment vis-à- 
vis the Association Agreement which has regulated the relation with the Community 
since 1963 and which lays down the respective rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties and also the timetable for their fulfillment."^^
Part of the reason why Turkey had submitted her application for full 
membership in 1987 was due to the assumption that the Association Agreement did no 
longer appear feasible. Turkey's main complaints at the time consisted of reproaching 
the Community for its failure to fulfill the obligations. The EC had still hindered 
Turkey's textile export business, had still not disbursed the fourth financial protocol, 
and had not met the deadline for applying the freedom of movement regulation for 
Turkish workers. For its part, the Community had complained that Turkey had also 
fallen behind her obligations. Turkey had failed in arranging for the agreed 
liberalization in trade in goods and the adoption of the common external tariff. While 
the custom tariffs towards the EC had been slightly reduced, the adjustment of Turkish 
custom tariffs to the Common Tariff System of the Community vis-à-vis third 
countries had not even started. In short, the Association Agreement had not made 
much progress for the past 15 years. Nevertheless, both sides agreed to restart the 
implementation of the provisions.
At the meeting of the Association Council on 9 November 1992, the Turkish 
government confirmed its readiness to finalize the establishment of a customs union
®^MUSTO, Stefan (1990): Turkey and the European Community - Policies, Problems and Future 
Aspects, in: KÖRNER, Heiko and Rasul Shams (eds.): Institutional Aspects of Economic Integration 
of Turkey into the European Community. HWWA-Insitut für Wirtschaftsforschung; Hamburg, 169.
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with the EC by 1995. The EC, on its side, agreed to the creation of an intensive 
political dialogue with Turkey on the highest level and showed its willingness to 
enhance economic and industrial cooperation. Political dialogue started in February 
1993 with a visit of Turkey's deputy prime minister Erdal İnönü to Bmssels, where he 
met with the presidents of the EC Commission and Council. In March, a common 
steering committee was set up, in order to prepare for the completion of the customs 
union. Its work resulted in a list of topics to be discussed and resolved in order to meet 
the 1995 deadline. This list was agreed upon as a working program for both sides at 
another meeting of the Association Council on 9 November 1993. It included no less 
than most of the provisions already forseen in the Ankara Agreement and the 
Additional Protocol^^: free circulation of goods, and abolition of all customs duties; 
implementation of the EC's common external tariff on goods from third countries; 
common trade policy; cooperation of the harmonization o f agricultural policy and 
provisions for reciprocal preferential market access; institutional provisions concerning 
decision-making and dispute-settlement procedures; economic, industrial, monetary, 
environmental, scientific, and cultural cooperation.
The working program represented a Herculean task, because it amounted to 
nothing less than doing everything necessary for the implementation of a functioning 
customs union between Turkey and the EU that had not been done since the 
conclusion of the Additional Protocol in 1972. The newly designed customs union, 
however, did not include the issue of free movement of labour, an aspect Turkey had 
constantly been pressing for. Apparently, Turkish policy-makers were willing to settle 
for less at this point of time.
In addition to these concessions, Turkey was forced to accept that the issue of 
full membership was not included in any of the declarations surrounding the process 
o f realizing the customs union. Turkey had thus agreed to a formula of "optimising a
*^summary according to KRAMER, Heinz (1994b): Wie weiter in den Beziehungen zur Türkei? 
Überlegungen anläßlich der Bemühungen um die Schaffung einer Zollunion zwischen der Europäischen 
Union und der Türkei, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Arbeitspapier SWP - AP 2871, Oktober 
1994, 18 - 22.
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'second-best approach' which leaves open the issue of accession by concentrating on 
hammering out a sort of 'special relationship' between the EC and Turkey. 
Evidendy, even though Turkey could obtain a prominent status, she was nevertheless 
put into a position outside the Community. The direct repercussions of this ambiguous 
proximity vis-à-vis the European Union could arise from the unequal balance the 
Customs Union agreement had created.
3,3. The Customs Union Agreement: An unequal balance
On 6 March 1995 the European Union and Turkey decided to strengthen their 
relations through the completion of a Customs Union. The agreement reached involves 
the adoption of an Association Council decision®^ (Decision 1/95) establishing the 
Customs Union, an Association Council Resolution providing for the development of 
institutional cooperation and political dialogue, and a Declaration by which the 
European Union announced the resumption of financial cooperation with Turkey.
The realization of the Customs Union (CU) completely changes the relation 
between Turkey and the European Union in several respects. Politically, it manoeuvers 
the two partners into an ambiguous proximity, which clearly disfavours Turkey. 
Economically, Turkey will not obtain any short-term benefits. To the contrary, much 
of the financial burden, arising from the opening of her markets, will be placed on 
Turkey alone.
The characterization of the CU's political and economic dimension at this 
point will be restricted to the effects resulting solely from institutional arrangements.
S^KRAMER (1994), 204.
^^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995a): Draft Decision on the Customs Union and its accompanying 
declarations, CE-TR 106/95; Brussels, 6 March 1995.
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Further attention to the increasing politicization of the customs union issue will be paid 
in the following chapter.
3.3.1. The political dimension of the Customs Union
The political dimension of the Customs Union carries less weight in Europe 
than in Turkey, where it is generally perceived as a political decision. A closer look at 
the political implications o f the CU suggests that Turkish perceptions are not 
unfounded.
- Transfer o f sovereignty
Above all, the CU establishes irreversible ties between the partners. In 
contrast to a free-trade zone, which abolishes the trade barriers between two or more 
contracting partners, a customs union also entails political implications. Setting up 
common external tariffs vis-à-vis third countries demands a degree of committment 
beyond the interest of trade, since it requires partial surrender of a nation-state's 
sovereignty. The transfer of political decision-making to a supra-national level 
normally means that the interest to be member of a supra-national group ranks higher 
than the national interest. With respect to these implications, however, the EU-Turkey 
customs union is a one-way street.
While Turkey transfers her sovereignty in the sector of foreign trade policy, 
she remains excluded from the political decision-making process that establishes these 
policies. In other words, relevant parameters of Turkish foreign trade policy will be set 
in Brussels, while the parliament in Ankara will have no say in the formulation of the 
relevant decisions. The range of policy decisions transfered to Brussels is not 
insignificant, as they include the two core sectors of trade policy. Both the extensive 
system of different trade preferences and the selective trade restrictions vis-à-vis third 
countries will apply. Thus, Turkey will be deprived of her basic instruments of
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autonomous foreign trade policy.®^ Consequently, part of her foreign policy 
formulation, e.g. towards the new republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, might 
suffer serious setbacks as it proves incompatible with the provisions o f the Customs 
Union agreement
The already existing discrepency between Turkey's economic and political 
integration into the European Union is increased by a lack of longterm perspective 
suggesting concrete steps of further rapprochement There are no indicators that the 
situation might change in the near future. While Turicey is tied economically to the EU 
like no other third country, it probably ranks last in a list of countries which prepare 
themselves for accession to the EU: "the enlargement debate continues - and Turkey 
does not appear to be part of it."®”^ Therefore, the arrangements cause tension not only 
because of the disparity between economic and political integration. In addition to that, 
it "must be very hurtful for Turkey to see itself slipping from the head to the tail of a 
lenghtening queue, behind states who were until very recently the other side of the 
great post-war ideological confrontation. As noted in the previous chapter, 
Turkey's application for full membership had partially fallen "victim" to the debate on 
deepening and widening that hit the Community during the preparations for the Treaty 
of Maastricht when further enlargements were to be considered.®^ In the post- 
Maastricht era, however, while Eastern European states are granted the utmost 
attention and their perspectives to become full members are openly discussed, 
Turkey's repeated exclusion must be received in Ankara as a double rejection.
®^KRAMER, Heinz (1995): Treibt die Zollunion die EU und die Türkei auseinander?, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper SWP-KA 2910; Ebenhausen, 13.
®^BROWN, John Murray (1994): Tansu Ciller and the Question of Turkish Identity, in; World 
Policy Journal, V oU l, No.3, Fall 1994, 58.
®®MARTIN, Laurence (1994): Turkey: Ambiguities of a Bridge and a Bulwark, in: WEIDENFELD, 
Werner and Josef Janning (eds.): Europe in Global Change. Strategies and Options for Europe; 
Gütersloh, 131.
®^among the large body of literature on this topic see the well-conceptualized WESSELS, Wolfgang 
and Christian Engel (1993)(eds.): The European Union in the 1990s - Ever closer and larger? Institut 
für Europäische Politik; Bonn.
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Consequently, the renunciation of foreign trade policy autonomy will be felt 
even stronger, because Turkey will increasingly become aware of the fact that she is 
basically excluded from the institutional EU framework.
While political commentators suspect Turkish nationalist and islamist forces 
to exploit this misrelation for their political purposes, the customs union agreement 
finds its critics also among moderate public figures. Professor Erol Manisali of 
Istanbul University has publicly pointed out that "Turkey has signed an agreement 
which only countries of colonial status would have ratified.
- Political dialogue and institutional cooperation
Even though the customs union agreement also entails provisions about the 
institutional cooperation and political dialogue for compensating the imbalance, the 
framework envisaged in the CUA protocols can hardly make up for the loss of 
sovereignty on the Turkish side. The procedures for institutional cooperation provide 
for the following:
- Annual meetings between the Turkish Head of State or of Government and the 
President of the Europiean Council and the President of the Commission,
- Half-yearly meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, while one of these meetings 
will coincide with the Association Council in the event of a meeting of the latter, the 
other will be held in Troika form,
- Regular meetings at K.4 level concerning issues of Justice and Home Affairs,
- Meetings of Senior officials on "sectoral" subjects of common interest, topics to be 
adressed in these meetings include environment, transport, trade and industrial matters, 
tele-communications, tourism, education, culture, research and the internal market, and 
economic and financial matters.
The political dialogue programme does not directly include topics such as 
foreign, security and defense policy to be discussed on a regular basis. It is stated.
90s Ot CO, Deniz(1995); Prof. Manisali: Customs union will put Turkey under control of Europe, 
Turkish Daily News, 26 September 1995.
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however, that the "consultations between Turkish and EU experts will be organized in 
certain CFSP Working Parties" and that Turkey will be "regularly informed of the 
outcome of the meetings of the European Council, the Council and the Political 
Committee by the Presidency or the Council secretariat". Moreover, "Turkey will 
receive on ad hoc basis documents of a fundamental nature regarding the common 
foreign and security policy". The chapter on political dialogue concludes that the 
"European Union can assure the Turkish side that it is continuing to give thought to 
intensifying the dialogue, if appropriate, "^ı
Even though Turkish negotiators have bargained for an institutionalized 
cooperation and political dialogue, the links established are a long way from real 
participation in EU politics. Therefore, they will hardly compensate for the loss of 
sovereignty, the CU agreement entails as a whole. Besides, the regularity of political 
dialogue depends on Greece's good will. As this unanimity decision is once again at 
Greek mercy, it seems unrealistic to expect that the Greeks will not instrumentalize 
their power as another bargaining chip in pursuing their interests. The Greek blocking 
of the Association Council meeting scheduled for 26 March 1996 can be taken as a first 
example for the future of "political dialogue" between Turkey and the European Union.
All in all, the customs union agreement has created an unequal political 
balance purely through its institutional arrangements. Whether this shaky basis can 
serve as solid ground for the future course of relations is at least questionable. As the 
next chapter will reveal, the customs union issue has developed its own dynamic, as it 
has become the target for further politicization by both European and Turkish 
politicians. It is nevertheless important to note that the overall political instability the 
customs union could potentially bring about cannot be attributed to popular politics 
alone. As the institutional arrangements do not equally include both partners’ 
expectations, the likelihood of its proper functioning is open to question. Students of
^^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995d): Draft Jlesolution of the EC-Turkcy Association Council 
(here: Political Dialogue), CE-TR 130/95; Brussels, 25 October 1995.
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institutionalism have proven that the longevity of international agreements could only 
be guaranteed if mutual interests were likewise looked after.^2
3.3.2. The economic dimension of the Customs Union
As far as the economic dimension of the Customs Union Agreement is 
concerned, it can be noted that it does not constitute a new attempt to regulate the 
relations. It can rather be seen as the overdue performance of historical contractual 
duties laid down in the Ankara Agreement of 1964 and the Additional Protocol of 
1973. The customs union coming into effect in 1996, however, is an incomplete 
implementation of the historical framework, since it contains only parts of the original 
concepts. Important issues such as the free movement of labour, the right of 
establishment and the free movement of services have been excluded for the time 
being.93 Trade in agricultural products, with the exception of agro-industrial products, 
that is processed food, is likewise excluded.
Thus, the only obvious advantage in the field of trade for Turkey lies in the 
removal of EU quotas on the imports of textiles and clothing, "Turkey's leading export 
locomotive"9^ , since it represents the only sector which had still been protected. With 
few exceptions, all other Turkish industrial products enjoyed free access to EC markets 
ever since the Additional Protocol had come into effect in 1973, when the EC 
abolished all tariffs at once.
Some customs union mechanisms, however, might have a reverse impact on 
trade, therefore contrary to expectations. The common external tariff towards third 
countries, e.g., has caused a decrease in export of Turkish clothing. Since a ten 
percent import tax will be placed on textiles imported from China or Pakistan, costs of
92KEOHANE (1989), 93 - 95.
^^O K SO Z, Mina (1996): The Turkey-EU customs union, in: Economist Intelligence Unit; European 
Trends, 1st quarter, 71 - 75.
^'‘TOKSOZ (1996), 73.
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production for Turkish companies will automatically rise. Thus, for the first half of 
1996, Turkish exports in clothing have decreased by nearly six per cent.^^
- Impact o f the Customs Union on public finance
While the customs union will directly influence the Turkish business 
community, it will also increase Turkey’s budget deficit. Considering that nearly 
seventeen per cent of Turkey’s tax revenues originate from duties placed on imports, 
the expected loss amounts to US$ 2,6 billion a n n u a l l y T h i s  loss weighs all the more 
as Turkey is suffering from a debt burden^^ and an increasing debt interest burden9^, 
which has grown rapidly within the last five years. Whereas in 1991 5 per cent of 
GNP were spent on paying back debts, in 1996 10 per cent of GNP will have to be 
spent respectively.^^
Turkish policy-makers are convinced, however, that harmonizing the 
structure, standards and legislative framework of the Turkish economy and bringing it 
into line with that of the EU will facilitate the inflow of foreign direct investment. 
Thus, they count on the positive effects, to make up for the costs arising from the loss 
of state revenues. The Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin at the 6 March 1995 
Association Council meeting pointed out that Turkey feels that "susbstantial increases 
in inflows of private direct investment will help to alleviate some of the burdens that 
Turkey will incur."^®® The Turkish government’s point of view stands in line with the 
comments and interests of US Commerce Secretary Ron Brown who argued that 
"Turkey’s economic gains will be directly related to the amount of foreign
^^Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 July 1996.
^^SEN, Faruk (1996): Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der Europäischen 
Union und die Auswirkungen der Zollunion auf die türkische Wirtschaft, in: Südosteuropa, Vol.45, 
No.4-5, 1996, 338.
^^Turkey ranks 7th in the list of countries with the highest debts.
^^Some 37 per cent of the 1996 state budget spending will go on servicing debt interest while only 7 
per cent will be spent on investment, see: THE ECONOMIST (1996): The elusive golden apple, 
Survey on Turkey, 11.
^^rankfuter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 October 1996.
lO^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995b): Projet de Proces-Verbal de la 36ibme session du Conseil 
d'Association C.E.-Turquie, 6 mars 1995, EC-TR 112/95 fin; Brussels, 20.
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investment"^®!. The prospects for foreign direct investment are good as foreign direct 
investor interest in Turkey continues to rise. Brown noted that in 1995 a record level of 
US$ 1.3 billion was invested in Turkey, a 50 per cent increase over 1994 levels.
In order to enhance cooperation and provide a forum of exchange between the 
economic and social interest groups of Turkey and the European Community, the 
Turkey-EC Joint Consultative Committee was established. The Joint Consultative 
Committee, comprising 18 members of the European Communities’ Economic and 
Social Committee (ESC) and equal number of representatives of Turkish economic and 
social interest groups, held its first session in Brussels on 16 November Í995^^^■
Apart from the perspective that foreign capital will support the Turkish 
economy, trade liberalization will mostly benefit the countries of the European Union, 
as the customs union is expected to give a major boost to EU exports to Turkey. Even 
though private consumption per person amounts to only US$ 3600 as compared to 
US$ 6400 in Greece and US$ 10700 in Germany!®^, Turkey's dynamic population 
growth of 2,5 % annually nevertheless makes it an interesting consumer market. 
Convinced of Turkey's (market) potential, the US Department of Commerce has 
identified Turkey as one of ten global "Big Emerging Markets"!®^, those countries 
which the United States believe will drive the world's economic growth over the next 
15 years. Turkey is already the EU's tenth biggest trading partner and exports are 
expected to double in the next five years. !®^
The two immediate effects of the customs union, loss of state revenues for 
Turkey and an unprecedented increase of imports originating in the European Union, 
places serious adjustment constraints on the overall Turkish economy. During the first 
half of 1996, the negative balance of Turkey's terms of trade with the European Union
!®!u NITED s t a t e s  INOFORMATION s e r v ic e  (1996); Turkish-American Relation in the USIS 
"Wireless File”, Embassy of the United States; Ankara, 9.
!®2e u R0PEAN c o m m u n it y  (1996): Activity Report of the Association Council to the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee; Ankara, 24-25 June 1996,7.
!®3t HE e c o n o m is t  (1996), 17.
lO'^UNTTED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE (1996), 10.
!®5t OKSOZ (1996), 71.
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has doubled and now amounts to nearly US$ 10 billion, as imports from the EU have 
risen by nearly 35 per cent Thus, Turkey was forced to introduce a six per cent special 
rate on nearly two thirds of all imports. Even though the customs union agreement 
allows for temporary protecting measures, in order to bring into balance large foreign 
trade deficits, the Turkish government should have consulted the EU Commission 
prior to introducing the measure. The Turkish chamber of commerce now fears that the 
EU might in turn introduce new trade barriers for Turkish imports.*®^
- Trade liberalization and adjustment problems
While public finance will struggle heavily as a result of lacking import tax 
revenues, the Turkish economy faces an equally tough challenge. The Turkish 
industrial sector will have to find ways to withstand competition and introduce further 
structural adjustments measures. Turkey's small scale economy, that is small and 
medium sized enterprises, however, will face serious existential problems.
In contrast to big industry, they do not have the necessary resources at their 
disposal. It remains uncertain, how this branch, which dominates the Turkish 
industrial sector, will survive the enhanced competition. Despite the fact that low 
labour costs will continue to guarantee cheap production, the competition with 
European products will force many enterprises to introduce modem technologies. As 
financial resources are scarce, it is difficult to predict how many of the small and 
medium sized enterprises will survive the lifting of protection.!®^ A study undertaken 
by the Istanbul Chamber of Industry gives a general idea about the level of the Turkish 
industry's competetive strength. According to the repon, only 35 percent of the small 
industries and 47 percent of the medium-sized industrial companies would be able to 
compete successfully with the EU countries.!®^ Unless appropriate financial assistance 
from the European Union will help to offset the negative effects of this structural
!®^Frankfurler Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 July 1996.
!®"^SEN (1996), 339.
!®^ELEKDAG, Şükrü (1995): A Pyrric victory, in: Milliyet, 22 October 1995, translation in: 
Turkish Daily News, 23 October 1 ^5 .
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change and support the adaptability, this part of the Turkish economy is highly 
endangered. The importance of the small and medium-sized enterprises weighs all the 
more, as their contribution to the creation of employment is far greater than that of the 
holding companies. At the same time, these enterprises have developed despite the lack 
of state support. In light of the fact that a healthy middle class emerging from the 
developments of this entrepreneurship might be endangered by the customs union, the 
European Union would need to ensure that financial aid is distributed smoothly and 
gradually. Besides, it would be necessary to ensure that aid is distributed to those parts 
of the Turkish economy which suffer most from adaptability problems.
- Financial aid
For the time being, the amount of aid to be received from the EU accounts to 
2,1 billion ECU for the coming five years, comprised of 600 million ECU as 4th 
financial protocol, 375 million ECU as Mediterranean Project credits, 300 to 400 
million ECU as project credits from the European Investment Bank, and 750 million 
ECU for the transformation and harmonization of the economy.^!®
Albeit the Association Council decisions providing for these measures, the 
regulations needed for the implementation of financial cooperation between Turkey and 
the European Community have not been adopted by the EC as of 31 December 1995. 
By the same token, the European Investment Bank has not acted, as of 31 December 
1995, upon the request addressed to it by the Council of Ministers in December 1995 
to start granting loans to Turkey as envisaged in the declaration by the EU on financial 
cooperation. Ч*
As nearly all parts of the financial package are tied to political decisions, it is 
doubtful whether a steady flow of credits and aid will reach Turkey. The aid
lO^Turkish Daily News, 9 December 1995.
Miikkerrem (1995): Turkey's Customs Union with the European Union. Economic and 
Political Prospects. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper SWP-AP 2926; Ebenhausen, 
22.
lllEUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1996), 11.
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programme MEDA, which can be seen as a parallel to the support programmes 
PHARE and TACIS which benefit Eastern European countries and the former Soviet 
Union, and which was prepared to support the countries of the Mediterranean, 
including Turkey, e.g., has been blocked by Greece. Even though agreed upon by the 
European Union at the Barcelona conference in November 1995, the aid programme 
could not be introduced properly. It was only in July 1996 that Greece could be 
convinced to lift its veto.^^2
The European Parliament which had made its positive assent for the adoption 
of decision 1/95 conditional on democratic reforms and the improvement of the 
standard of human rights in Turkey, in September 1996 adopted a strongly worded 
resolution, condemning the situation in Turkey. Consequently, the European 
Parliament demanded a freeze in financial cooperation and put a halt on all financial aid 
Turkey would receive as part of the allocations from the MEDA programme.^
Even though the cost-benefit analysis of the economic dimension of the 
customs union shows that the accords clearly disfavour Turkey, a fair summary would 
need to consider the fact that the agreement should not be seen as the only instrument 
which finally op>ened the Turkish economy to international competition. In line with the 
new World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, Turkey would have had to pursue many 
of the trade liberalisation measures in the context of the WTO "irrespective of the 
Customs Union agreement"
Nevertheless, the treaty signed by the Turkish government and the EU- 
Council on 6 March 1995, clearly represents an unequal balance that places a heavy 
burden on Turkey. In accordance with the political and economic dimensions described 
above one can conclude that Turkey has not struck a good deal with the European 
Union. Before examining the politicization the customs union issue has witnessed in 
both European and Turkish domestic circles, it is deemed necessary to take a closer
 ^^ ^Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 July 1996.
**^EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1996a): Resolution on the political situation in Turkey, DOC PE 
252.050; Strasburg, 19 September 1996.
“ '^TOKSOZ (1996), 71.
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look at both parties’ motives and interests to come to a conclusion over a customs 
union.
3.4. Again: Motives and Interests. Why a Customs Union?
In light of the unequal distribution of burden of the Customs Union, it seems 
appropriate to ask, why both partners wanted such an agreement to come into being. A 
closer look at the communication of the Association Council Meetings is deemed 
helpful to reveal the subsequent positions. The last three meetings scheduled before the 
customs union came into effect took place on 19 December 1994, 6 March 1995 (CU 
was agreed upon politically), and 30 October 1995.
3.4.1. Far from certain: The EU attitude
As the upcoming chapter will reveal, the EU can no longer be portrayed as a 
coherent entity. Political actors on several levels represent different interests and 
attitudes. As the arena of the decision-making hierarchy is opened vertically to the 
European Parliament, foreign policy directions will be guided by different premises. It 
goes without saying, however, that the Council of the EU still remains the most 
powerful body within the institutional framework. Its decisions are based on the 
principle of unanimity. As one member state can easily veto the consensus needed for 
decision-making, however, its flexibility is restricted. Consequently, these 
mechanisms make it difficult to assess the EU as one coherent political actor. When 
referred to, it is necessary to keep in mind that the "EU's point of view" is heavily 
fragmented and diverse. The positions portrayed below can suggest only a general 
trend attributed to the EU’s policy perspective towards Turkey.
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In contrast to the discussions and debates that took place during the 
Parliamentary Sessions of the European Parliament, the representatives at the 
Association Council generally kept a moderate tone. Their position ressembles more to 
that of Realpolitik, which finds its incentives in a simple cost-benefit analysis. Hans- 
Jörg Haber, first counsellor at the German embassy in Ankara summarized the 
negotiations over a customs union by stating that "we got the most out of it".'
While the agreement on the customs union was already on the agenda of the 
Association Council meeting in Bmssels on 19 December 1994, the item was removed 
due to Greece's veto blocking the decision once more and deferring it to the upcoming 
meeting. Sir Leon Brittan, member of the European Commission, pointed out that he 
"would personally go so far as to say that if there were not political problems, I cannot 
believe that by today we would not have been able to reach an agreement on all 
points""^. Whereas the representative of the Commission displayed optimism about 
the necessary adjustments of merely technical nature, the concluding statement by EU 
Council President Klaus Kinkel revealed that the process of completing the customs 
union would be imbedded in a broader political framework, as has always been the 
case with the development of the Association Agreement Even though Kinkel made it 
clear that he was speaking "on behalf of eleven Member States and the three acceeding 
States""^, and thereby distancing himself from the statement of the Greek delegate 
Kranidiotis, he pointed out that the "Union remains deeply preoccupied by the 
unresolved question of Cyprus". As a consensus among all Member States he 
presented the view that "strict observance of internationally recognized human rights 
standards is a crucial element in the process of developing still closer ties with 
European institutions""^.
"^Interview with Hans-Jörg Haber, first counsellor, German embassy: Ankara, 8 November 1995. 
"^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994): Minutes of the 35th meeting of the EC-Turkey Association 
Council, 19 December 1994, EC-TR 126/94 fin; Brussels, 23.
"■^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994), 7.
"»EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994), 31.
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Although Kinkel pointed to these issues, the coTimunication towards Turkey 
made it clear that the European Council as the executive decision-making body of the 
European Union showed no particular signs of making the customs union subject to 
political preconditions. Distancing himself from th; Greek position could be 
understood by the Turkish delegation as a proof that th< Member States would press 
the Greeks to give up their veto and thereby clear the way for a positive decision which 
at this stage depended on the unanimity vote within the Council.
As had been the case in earlier arrangements, however, the decision-making 
bodies within the EU lacked a profound point of view about where they wished their 
relations with Turkey to go. While the possibilities of accession of the Eastern 
European States were already widely discussed^^^, the qrestion about Turkey's exact 
location vis-à-vis or within the new European Union wis slowly disappearing from 
the agendas in Brussels and the member states. Directing their efforts at the rapid 
consolidation of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, the case of Turkey was 
increasingly dealt with in the framework of the European Union's new Mediteiranean 
Policy. The Commission of the EC, e.g., assigns the operative responsibility for its 
relations with Turkey to that part of its general directoratefor external relations (DG I) 
that deals with "North-South relations and Mediterranean policy, relations with Latin 
America and Asia" and not to the part that deals with, among other things, "co­
operation with other European c o u n t r i e s " .£U  Council President Kinkel's 
preliminary statement at the opening of the December 1994 Association Council 
meeting clearly pointed in this direction. Emphasizing tiat the Mediteranean basin 
represented an area of strategic importance to the Europîan Union, the EC Council 
President said that peace, stability and prosperity of that region were among top EU 
priorities. He suggested that with the "Euro-Mediterrantan Ministerial Conference 
planned for 1995, the European Union and Turkey will doibtless find, over and above
^^^NICOLAIDES, Phedon and Armand Close (1994); The process aid politics of enlargement, in: 
European Trends, 1st quarter 1994,70 - 79.
12ÛKRAMER (1994), 190.
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the already close relations existing between them under the Association Ageement, a 
new area of fruitful cooperation."i2i On the one hand, these remarks can be seen as 
clear signal that the EU exercised restraints vis-à-vis Turkey. On the other hand, the 
repeated willingness to conclude a customs union with Turkey, reveals the EU’s two­
fold strategy to keep Turkey at a semi-peripheral distance from the European Union, 
an ambiguous proximity, that can be defined as required.
When the customs union was finally agreed on at the Association Council 
meeting held in Brussels on 6 March 1995, the Commissioner for External Relations 
of the EU, Hans van den Broek, gave an example of the rhetoric on which the 
European motivation for coming to a conclusion with Turkey was based. 
Characterising the customs union, he stated that it represented "un arrangement d’une 
telle ampleur qui offre tant de possibilités" ^ 2^ J q speak o f a wide range of 
possibilities that the customs union would offer, however, only took into 
consideration the advantages the European Union would await. With open doors for 
free trade in a large market, the Union did not have to put forward any substantial 
committment in exchange, except for the reactivation of the fourth financial protocol 
which had been blocked since 1981.
Notwithstanding the vague picture o f a "wide range of possibilities" the 
customs union agreement might offer to both the EU and Turkey, the declaration of the 
decision 1/95 did not include any particular reference to the likelihood of Turkey’s 
possibility to become a full member of the EU. W hile on the one hand the CUA 
confirmed the validity of the Ankara Agreement, it painfully avoided any reference to 
Article 28 of the historical contract which forsees the eventuality of Turkey's accession 
to the EU.
At the same meeting, Alain Juppé, in his position as the President of the EU 
Council, made an effort to bring to the attention of the Turkish delegation that Europe
121EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994), 22. 
122EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995b). 14.
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is itself a moving target. Referring to the dynamics of the European integration, Juppé 
made it entirely clear that the Union of 1995 can no more be considered the EEC of the 
1960s: "Certes, la mise en place définitive de l'union douanière que cette décision 
comporte découle largement d'engagements que nous avons souscrits de part et d'autre 
dans l'Accord d'Ankara de 1963 et dans le Protocole additional de 1973. Mais (...) le 
cadre général concu à l'époque en fonction des circonstances prévalant au début des 
années 1970 a, entre temps, considérablement évoloué."^^
In addition to that, Juppé referred to the reinforcement and significance ("je 
tiens à souligner d'une manière tout particulière") of the political dialogue, to be 
institutionalized between Turkey and the EU. Given the restricted extent of political 
dialogue, as described above, EU Council President Alain Juppé left no doubt that this 
would be about as far as the EU desired to embrace Turkey.
To sum up, the European Union considers the Customs Union Agreement as 
a treaty in its own right, which deliberately leaves out further perspectives. Led by the 
desire to maintain good relations, the EU, has, however, once again missed to send 
signals to Ankara, which would allow for an undisputable definition of the state of 
relations.
3.4.2. Turkey's new strategy:
Towards "differentiated integration"
A first observation shows that Turkey's negotiation team present at the 
Association Council meetings was comprised mainly of foreign ministry staff. Since 
representati\es of the State Planning Organisation and the Treasury attended the
^23e u R0PEAN c o m m u n it y  (1995b), 10.(The definite putting into place of a customs union 
which will be the result of today's decicion draws basically from the agreements we have signed in the 
Ankara Agreement of 1963 and in the Additional Protocol of 1973. But (...) the general framework 
envisaged during that period of time, which was directed at the particular circumstances of the 1970s, 
has changed considerably."
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meetings only on an irrergular basis, it can be inferred that Turkey's motivation to 
conclude a Customs Union with the EU was primarily based on political 
considerations. Usually not influenced by daily popular politics, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs represents traditionally a unified. W estern-orientated body.^^4 
Likewise, its representatives susbsume the slogan of Turkey's longstanding vocation 
européenne. In the beginning, Turkey's negotiation position was guided by taking a 
point of view that refused to redefine relations below the level of full membership.
It came thus as no surprise that Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin 
pointed out during the Association Council meeting on 6 March 1995, that "Turkey 
regards the Customs Union as one of the main instruments of her political and 
economic modernization"
Encouraged by the alleged scope of the new agreement facilitated the Turkish 
delegation to uphold their high expectations. As had been repeatedly stated by the 
Turkish decision-makers, their motivation for the customs union to come into being, 
was primarily based on the assumption that the relations would not stop here. As the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Karayalcin stated during the December 1994 
Association Council meeting, the Turkish side assumed that "the Customs Union is 
not an end in itself. There are no examples of customs unions which have not led to 
more integration. The Customs Union should and will serve as a stepping-stepping 
stone to the realization of the final objective of the Association which remains my 
government's long-standing goal."i26 Optimistic about the possible economic 
repercussions the Customs Union might bring about, the Turkish point of view 
obvjously counted on the automatic spill-over effects of such an agreement.
Karayalcin repeated his point of view once more during the 6 March 1995 
meeting, stating that the Turkish delegation "believes that the Customs Union 
Agreement will anchor us to Europe in line with the basic orientations of our *
*24see the insightful account of CALIS, Saban (1995): The Turkish State's Identity and Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making Process, in: Mediterranean Quarterly, Spring 1995, 135 - 155. 
125EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995b), 18.
126EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994), 28.
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Republic"^^^. Karayalcin added that the Turkish expectations from the successful 
completion of the Customs Union were not limited strictly to commercial 
considerations. Above all, the CUA represented for the Turkish side a "reaffirmation 
of the objective of full membership of Turkey in the European Community (...) we 
feel entitled to participate in the construction of Europe on an equal basis with all other 
European nations. To us, the Customs Union is not a substitute, but a stepping-stone 
towards this broader perspective" ^ 2*.
It is fair to say, though, that the Turkish position as laid down by Foreign 
Minister Karayalcin was exaggerated. In other words, the Turkish delegation must 
have been aware that any concession concerning full membership was out of the 
question for the European Union. With nothing to bargain with, however, the Turkish 
side found itself in a deadlock with not much room for manoeuvre. Pressing for more 
integration must have come to deaf ears on the European side. The EU, on its part, 
was very well aware of Turkey’s weak negotiation position and found it unnecessary 
to offer more to Turkey: "The Turkish government did not negotiate the 6 March 1995 
decision for CU from a strong economic and political basis. It seemed eager to cut a 
deal and then sell the decision to enter CU to the Turkish public as a success stoiy, and 
as the only way, a necessary but not sufficient step to Turkey's future full 
membership."^^^
The new foreign minister Deniz Baykal repeated this political stance in his 
foreign policy statement delivered on 3 November 1995 before the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly; "The Customs Union will expedite and assist Turkey's full 
membership’130. The designation of the Customs Union as "one of the most important 
policy objectives of our recent history"i3i, as Baykal stated, obviously sheds a light
127EUROEPAN COMMUNITY (1995b), 18.
128EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995b), 19.
129fflC (1995), 7.
l^Oporeign Policy Statement by H.E. Deniz Baykal, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime 
Minister deliveied on 3 November 1995 before the Turkish Grand National Assembly, copied 
transcript; Ankara, 2.
131 Foreign Policy Statement, 1.
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on the increasing importance of the agreement as a tool in the election campaign, as 
Turkish voters were expected at a general election on 24 December 1995, only 10 days 
after the agreement was to be ratified by the European Parliament. Thus, Turkish 
politicians have instrumentalized the customs union issue for domestic political 
purposes. With general elections at the end of December 1995, politicians have tried to 
sell the coming into force of the customs union as a great victory that they personally 
have achieved. Senior politician Bülent Ecevit, leader o f the Demokratik Sol Partisi 
(Democratic Left Party, DSP), urged that a revision o f the CUA must be made: "I 
think it is an unforgivable mistake for both Ciller and Baykal to have turned the 
customs union issue into a chance to gain political prestige in the arena of domestic 
politics. A mistake because this has made Turkey lose her bargaining power"i32.
After negotiators had claimed to be bargaining for full membership for a very 
long time, during the last Association Council Meeting on 30 October 1995, the 
official diplomatic Turkish position on full membership slowly started to soften. 
Represented by Coşkun Kirca, who served a few weeks as interim foreign minister 
while a new coalition was formed, the Turkish delegation adopted a different attitude. 
Kirca took up the problematic situation of déséquilibre, the customs union would bring 
about and stated that the level of political dialogue was disappointing: "En ce qui 
concerne la coopération institutionelle et le dialogue politique, il serait difficile à 
prétendre que l'état actuel de nos relations est satisfaisant."i33
Moreover, Foreign Minister Coşkun Kirca made it clear that the negotiation 
party would face difficulties presenting the results at home. Kirca said that in the 
absence o f a political gesture which would express the solidarity of the European 
Union, "notre gouvernement se serait trouvé dans une position délicate vis-à-vis de 
son opinion publique. "^ 3'* Kirca pointed to the fact that the unequal balance would be
leader of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), BUlent Ecevit laid down his opinion on the 
customs union in a lengthy two-page interview in Turkish Daily News, 9 December 1995, B7+B8. 
^^^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995c): Projet de Proces-Verbal de la 37ième session du ConseU 
d'Association C.E.-Turquie, 30 octobre 1995; Luxembourg, 23.
134EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995c), 21.
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judged as distriminating, especially when compared to certain other countries. It 
would thus b< necessary to improve and redesign the structural dialogue without 
which a propel functioning of the customs union could not be ensured.
Despite the fact that Kirca held up the high expectations, he painfully avoided 
repeated references concerning the Turkish desire for full inclusion in EU 
mechanisms. The only remark he made concerning full membership remained 
moderate in tone: "Notre demande d'adhésion à l'Union européenne reste valide."i35 
Instead he reformulated the Turkish position and presented the scenario of 
differentiated integration: "Le développement de la coopération et l’intégration 
différencie lié« aux besoins des secteurs spécifiques ont acquis une importance tout
particulière"i3i
The Turkish wish to participate in the discussion on sectoral development 
strategies in a larger European framework expresses that Turkey would be most keen 
to add to the bilateral dialogue with the EU the inclusion into some kind of multilateral 
European environment. While for years the discussion of EC-Turkey relations had 
revolved exclusively around the extreme poles of inclusion or exclusion, the Turkish 
position as presented on the 30 October 1995 Association Council meeting by Foreign 
Minister Coskiin Kirca was the first time that flexible formulas entered the discussion. 
The concept of differentiated integration would offer the precious advantage of 
avoiding discrimination between Turkey and the Eastern European countries. 
According to this model, each candidate for accession would participate in as many 
sectors of the ccqms communautaire as its capacity allows for.
This ¿lift in Turkey's EU-policy has gained a much stronger momentum after 
the customs union has come into being. Adopting a much more pragmatic approach 
towards her relations with the European Union, the possibility of differentiated 
integration has taken a prominent place within Turkey’s EU-policy. Nihat Akyol,
D5EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995c), 29. 
136EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995c), 24.
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deputy general director of the European desk in Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
has summarized Turkey's policy goals as a "politique des petits pas - petits, mais 
determini"i37^ a slow but steady approach embracing an increasing number of policy 
sectors which would allow Turkey a smooth, but realistic possibility of integration. 
Engaging in the formulations of credible scenarios, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
taken up some of the policy recommendations prepared at the Turkish Foreign Policy 
Institute, where a strategy paper was developed, which devised a viable pattern for 
Turkey's European policy. Above all, it suggested that "Turkey's approach to the 
formation of an expanded European entity must be guided by realism rather than 
wishful thinking." Instead of adapting a recriminating posture concerning lost 
opportunities or attempting to "seek the reaffirmation of conditions described in past 
agreements with a smaller and different entity"i39 Turkey would be well advised to 
finally recognize the European dynamic and understand the debate over enlargement in 
the form of differentiated integration as a challenge. With the emergence of models 
such as "variable geometry" the paralyzing dichotomy between full membership on the 
one hand and complete exclusion from the European Union on the other hand could be 
overcome. The perspective o f differentiated integration offers Turkey more 
manouevring space. Having refused to redefine the relations below the level of full 
membership had for a long period paralyzed any sort of sensible rapprochement
Turkey's policy-making elite in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
apparently taken up this positive attitude. In a most recent account, it is stated that with 
the inclusion of other countries into the European Union by means of differentiated 
integration, Turkey's chances of becoming a member would rise as well: "II est
^37interview with Nihat Akyol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Desk, Deputy General 
Director; Ankara, 7 June 1996.
Ahmet (1996): Turkey-EU relations on the eve of IGC. The Social and Cultural 
Dimension, in: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE (eds.): Turkey and the European Union. 
Nebulous Nature of Relations; Ankara, March 1996,40.
139EVIN (1996), 40.
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possible de dire que, l'Europe s'élargissant vers ses frontières naturelles, l'adhésion 
de la Turquie se trouve facilitée".
3.5. An interim balance: Limited Common Perspectives
The Customs Union Agreement that came into being on 1 January 1996 has 
established the institutional framework which from now on defines Turkey-EU 
relations. The new arrangement rests on three pillars:
It establishes a customs union between both parties 
It provides for limited institutional cooperation and political dialogue 
It foresees the reestablishment of financial cooperation on several levels. 
Instead of serving as a stabilising element in the relations between Turkey and the 
European Union, however, the accord might turn into an "explosive c h a r g e " f o r  
several reasons.
First of all, the institutional framework as such bears several weaknesses, 
since it does not provide for a balance of obligations and rights of the two partners. 
Economically, Turkey will have to bear the consequences of stiff competition, as EU- 
exports to Turkey will rapidly increase. Politically, Turkey will have to transfer part of 
sovereignty to the EU and Ankara will have to adjust to policies in the formation of 
which she will not have participated. These disadvantages that originate fix>m the CUA 
were thought to be reconciled by additional measures. Whereas political dialogue and 
institutional cooperation were designed to make up for the loss of political sovereignty, 
financial cooperation was intended to alleviate the economic burden. Both instruments.
^'^^AKYOL, Nihat (1996); Le développement des rellUons Turquie-Union eunçéenne, Paper presented 
at the conference "La Turquie et la Méditerranée", held at the University of Antalya in collaboration 
with Université de Paris II; Antalya, 6 Mai 1996,11.
*‘*^KRAMER, Heinz (1995): Treibt die Zollunion die EU und die Türkei auseinander?, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper SWP-KA 2910, July 1995; Ebenhausen, 7.
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however, are subject to political supervision and therefore, the implementation cannot 
be understood as a fixed process as it depends on political decisions.
The underlying problem of the CUA is created by the fact that both parties 
disagree on the intentions they associate with the agreement. Comparing the EU's 
motivation for wanting the agreement to come into being with that of Turkey shows 
that there exists an obvious discrepancy.
The European Union, for its part, regards the accord as a treaty in its own 
right which does not entail any further obligations. From the EU's point of view, the 
new arrangement has placed Turkey in a convenient position; an ambigious proximity 
that can be defined as required.
Turkey's intention, on the other hand, is still inevitably linked to the desire to 
become an integral part of the European Union. The new institutional framework, 
however, does not directly provide for Turkey's expectations. As the arrangement will 
bring about a situtation that is to Turkey's disadvantage both politically and 
economically, the dissatisfaction with the new kind of association might easily lead to 
the accusation of the European Union. The latent notion of "feeling rejected by the 
Europeans" is already inherent in the Turkish public opinion. As pointed out earlier, a 
large part of Turkey's population interprets the customs union as an unjust treatment 
and the accord is already perceived negatively. "Turkey is only offered a customs 
union based on the formula 'connection without committment'", wrote a lead article 
under the headline "The Isolation Campaign" in Turkey's popular liberal paper Yeni 
YuzyiM\ This is seen as a double standard in comparison with the Eastern European 
states, whose relation with the EU is much shorter than that of Turkey.
A fair summary would also have to take into account that the outcome of the 
negotiations as laid down in the new institutional framework of EU-Turkey relations
^'^^quoted in SAKALLIOGLU, Ümit Cizre (1996): National Identity versus integration with the 
West; The Case of Turkish Naitonalism, unpublished paper, Bilkent University, January 1996,1.
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clearly displays the inherent power asymmetries. Turkey, in comparison to the level of 
EU member states a weak country, has sacrificed some degree of autonomy in order to 
permit herself to gain acceptance into a club of prosperous states, governed by rules 
that apply to all members. Apparendy, negotiations have been conducted on the basis 
of proposals drafted by the Community. It can be maintained, however, that in order 
to benefit from further integration with the EC, policy changes in Turkey would have 
to occur anyway. Thus, the Turkish decision for "bandwagoning" rather than 
"balancing" within the alliance is also a natural consequence o f its bargaining 
weakness: "Weakness means that nothing is gained by holding back one's concessions 
as 'bargaining chips' with the Community, which is unwilling to enter into give-and- 
take negotiations.
On the other hand, compliance with EC rules and policies could be 
understood and interpreted in Turkey rather as an effect than a precondition of closer 
ties with the Community, only under the circumstances of undertaking the adoption of 
the acquis corrmunautaire in anticipation of full or differentiated membership. In the 
absence of such signals, however, the obvious discord between rights and obligations 
will only be reinforced. This might be furthered by the phenomenon of tying the new 
CUA to political preconditions as the following chapter will reveal.
^'*^KEOHANE, Robert O. and Stanley Hoffmann (1993): Conclusion: Sturcture, Strategy and 
Institutional Roles, in: KEOHANE, Robert, et al (eds.): After the Cold War. Intemationd Institutions 
and state strategies in Europe, 1989 - 1991; Cambridge, 388.
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4. The Customs Union Agreement as a 
political bargaining process.
- Actors and Issues in internal dynamics - 
A liberalist analysis
The previous chapter has analysed the institutional framework which from 
now on defines EU-Turkey relations and has sought to examine the interest as 
embodied by the intergovernmental agencies. This chapter is devoted to analyse the 
impact internal dynamics on both sides have taken on the relations. On the European 
side, the procedure of decision-making will be put under close scrutiny. With regard to 
the Turkish side, it will be asked which main factors impinge upon a development of 
better relations. - -
4.1. Negotiating Decision 1/95: New Players in the EU framework
The internal dynamics of the European Union can be analysed best by 
looking at the EU's complex procedure of foreign policy formulation. Which actors, it 
will be asked, serve as "agenda-setters", that is actors raising particular subjects within 
the process of policy-making, or set conditions which are added to the foreign policy 
agenda. As far as the decision making process on the European side is concerned, two 
main provisions stand out.
First, EU Council decisions require unanimity. Therefore, it is necessary to 
analyse how this process of "inter-governmental bargaining" which is meant to pool 
sovereignty has taken an impact on the CUA. Particular attention is to be given to 
Greece which emerged as a powerful agenda-setter with regard to the development of 
EU-Turkey relations.
Second, it is to be noted that part of the EU's foreign policy no longer 
remains domaine réservé of the executive. As a result o f the Maastricht Treaty the 
European Parliament has to ratify international treaties with third countries. As the EP
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traditionally emphasizes democracy and human rights it has likewise come to play an 
increasingly important role with regard to EU-Turkey relations.
4.1.1. Agenda-Setter I: Greece
Considering the complex procedure of EU decision-making it must be 
underscored that multilateral situations offer substantial incentives to behave as a "free­
rider" - not to pay for the good, but to gain from its provision by others. The 
obvious outcome for the whole group is less cooperation. The attitude o f Greece 
towards Turkey after its accession to the EU can be seen as an example o f the "free 
rider".
The perennial Greek-Turkish conflict became an issue in Turkey-EC relations 
after Greece had achieved EC membership in 1981. Ever since, "Greece has adopted a 
virtually unremittingly hostile approach towards Turkey"^^^. The majority of the 
Turkish political public is convinced that Greece abuses its membership in the EU in 
order to spoil Turkey-EU relations. It is equally convinced that the EU institutions as 
well as Greece's partners in the EU do not put up sufficient resistance against this.
The Turkish view is not completely unfounded, given that the EC Presidency 
in 1975 assured the Turkish government that the Greek application would not affect 
Turkey's rights vis-à-vis the C o m m u n i t y . T h e  EU, however, is bound to its 
decision-making rules. Most of the decisions for the implementation of EU activities 
within the framework of EU-Turkey association need unanimity in the EU Council, 
i.e. Greek consent.
^'^KEOHANE (1989), 139.
1'*5r e d MOND (1993a). 39.
146s t e p h a NOU, Constantine and Charalambos Tsardamides (1991): The EC factor in the Greece- 
Turkey-Cypras triangle, in: CONSTAS, Dimitri (ed.): The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s; 
London, 209.
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As "Greek foreign policy is above all 'Turkey policy'"^'*^, Greece has not 
hesitated to enforce its top priorities. In 1987, the Greek government had even 
seriously looked into the possibility o f asking the Community’s European Court o f 
Justice to annul the Council’s decision to ask the Commission to even prepare an 
"opinion" on the Turkish request. Another example of Greece’s continuous 
attempts at blocking any new movement in EC-Turkey relations could be seen in its 
stubborn resistance to even recognize the EC-Turkey Association. Only as a result of 
the temporary Greek-Turkish rapprochement in 1988 (the so-called "spirit of Davos"), 
Greece signed the Association Agreement in March 1988. '^*^
Although Turkey and Greece have a long list of issues resulting from political 
rivalry such as the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles, the question of the 
continental shelf, demilitarization of the Greek islands, human rights abuses against the 
Turkish minority in Western Thrace and the question of the Orthodox Patriarchate in 
Istanbul^^®, the Turco-Greek conflict is strongly linked to the Cyprus issue. Far- 
reaching in its implications and having generated more military tension than any other 
issue in dispute between Turkey and Greece, the question over the future of Cyprus 
cannot be disentangled, unless the Turco-Greek conflict is solved first. The fact that 
UN bicommunal talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots have not been very 
successful underline this necessity.^^^ Turkey and Greece, however, differ radically in 
their positions of how to arrange the future of Cypms. While Turkey wants to create a 
bizonal and bicommunal federal state before she would withdraw her military forces, 
Greece envisions the creation of a bizonal state in which Greek Cypriots enjoy majority 
and Turkish Cypriots minority representation. The Greeks have upheld their position
^'^^AXT, Heinz-Jürgen (1992): Griechenlands Außenpolitik und Europa: Verpaßte Chancen und neue 
Herausforderungen; Baden-Baden, 61. 
l'^^KRAMER (1994), 212.
149voLKAN, Vamik D. and Norman Itzkowitz (1994): Turks & Greeks. Neighbours in Conflict; 
Huntington, 158.
^^®for a consicc summary see GÜREL, Şükrü (1993): Turkey and Greece: a difficult Aegean 
relationship, in: BALKIR, Canan and Allan M. Williams (eds.)i Turkey and Europe; London, 161 - 
190.
151 STEARNS (1992), 146.
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that they see the withdrawal of Turkish troops as a necessary precondition for any 
talks.
The situation on Cyprus has been in a stalemate mainly because of 
exaggerated national pride and a total lack of mutual confidence. These factors have not 
facilitated the disentanglement of the conflict. Confronted with one another, the 
situation never generated much positive outcome. One author suggests that "when 
national pride interprets flexibility as weakness and trade-offs as capitulations, a third 
party role is e s s e n t i a l . S i n c e  Greece's membership in the EC has altered the 
Turkish-Greek balance achieved in the association agreement, the Community could 
not act as a mediator, because it was no longer a "third party". The Community did, 
however, for a very long time, approach the Greco-Turkish conflict from a position of 
"benevolent neutrality".^^^
Since its entry into the EC, however, Greece has sought to rally its EC 
partners behind its national position in the struggle with Turkey and place the Cyprus 
issue on the EC's foreign policy agenda. This effort was not successful until the late 
1980s. It was only in preparation for the meeting of the Association Council of 25 
April 1988, the first meeting after Turkey had submitted her application for full 
membership, that the Greek government succeeded in getting a formula included in the 
EC's opening statement that "the Cypms problem affects EC-Tmkey relations" 
This in turn led to a boycotting of the meeting by the Turkish foreign minister. 
Subsequently, the issue of the "Cyprus formula" in the EC opening statement became a 
point of disagreement between Turkey and the EC. The EC repeated its point of view 
in 1989, when it included the "Cypms formula" in its opinion on Turkey's request of 
accession to the Community. The EC hardened its position by including this formula in
152STEARNS (1992), 81.
^^^ESCHE, Matthias (1990): A History of Greek-Turkish relations, in: EVIN, Ahmet and Geoffrey 
Denton (eds.): Turkey and the European Community; Opladen, 111.
154KRAMER (1996), 217.
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the Presidency conclusions of the Dublin meeting of the European Council in June 
1990. Since then it can be seen as part of the acquis communautaire.^^^
When Cyprus submitted its application for full membership in the EU in July 
1990, the Turkish-Cypriot government supported by Ankara argued that the 
application was illegal both from the point of view of Cypriot constitutional law and 
from the point of view of international law. The EU Council, however, ignored the 
Turkish concerns and passed the application to the Commission to prepare an 
"opinion"· The EU's position solidified when the Commission in July 1993 confirmed 
Cyprus’ eligibility to acceed to the Community. The Commission pointed out, 
however, that "Cypms' integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced 
and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question" in order to "create the appropriate 
conditions for Cyprus to participate normally in the decision-making process of the 
European Community and in the correct application of Community law throughout the
island"i56.
Even though it appears exaggerated to evaluate Greek EC-membership as 
"one of the key factors in the development of EC-Turkey relations"^^^, it is fair to say 
that having placed the Cyprus issue on the Community’s foreign policy agenda can be 
seen as a clear Greek victory. It appears very unlikely that the Cyprus issue will 
emerge as the potential obstacle that might stand in the way of Turkey-EU relations, 
yet, its relevance can be located elsewhere. By having adopted the Greek point of view 
on Cyprus without ever having proposed a concrete scheme for a peaceful solution 
itself, the Community has reinforced the Turkish perception that the EU actively 
supports the Greek ambitions. Even though this is not the case, an equation of Greek 
and EU positions on the Cyprus issue in turn adds to the prevalent Turkish 
misconception that "Europe" is one coherent actor.
l^^KRAMER (1994), 236.
156COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993): Commission Opinion on the 
Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership; Brussels, 30 June 1993, Doc. COM(93) 313 
fin.
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In addition to that, the adoption of the Greek point of view has made it 
increasingly difficult for the EU Council to overcome Greek resistance to an 
improvement of EU-Turkey relations, because Greece will make its consent dependent 
on parallel progress (in the Greek sense) in the Cyprus issue. With this bargaining 
counter in hand, Greece has constantly blocked not only the fourth financial protocol, 
but has also vetoed until 1992 on the horizontal financing element of the EC's revised 
Mediterranean policy, which also benefits Turkey.*^^
The negotiations over the Customs Union Agreement between the EU and 
Turkey have displayed once more Greece's power in placing a veto on all political 
decisions and her potential to at least slow down the speed of developments.
When Turkey and the EU convened at the Association Council meeting on 19 
December 1994, in order to set in motion the necessary steps for the coming into effect 
of a the Customs Union Agreement, the plan fell through because of Greece. Headed 
by its President Klaus Kinkel, the EU Council could but emphasize that it "was 
making the preliminary statement on behalf of eleven Member States and the three 
acceeding States"^^^, thereby publicly renouncing the Greek statement. Kinkel's 
statement very much characterizes the crucial stalemate Association Council decision­
making sometimes cannot overcome. Bound by the unanimity decision-making rules, 
the EU Council could thus not give its political consent for a customs union to come 
into being.
This decision was deferred to a meeting on 6 March 1995. Greece had flexed 
its muscles and revealed its bargaining power once again. Threatening to veto the 
Customs Union, the Council decided to offer a trade-off to Greece. On 24 February 
1995, the General Secretariat of the Council announced that for the purpose of 
reaching "an overall compromise concerning the general political framework for 
developing future relations between the European Union and Turkey" the EU would
158REDMOND (1993a), 39. 
159EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1994), 7.
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start negotiations for Cyprus' accession 6 m onths after the end o f the 
Intergovernmental Conference, in the event of unanimous agreements on the proposal 
for the Customs Union^^, in other words, if Greece refrained from using its veto.
While the Greeks and the Cypriot Greeks see the admission of Cyprus to the 
EU as a necessary catalyst for a solution, it seems unlikely that an entry before 
settlement will generate a promising future. At the Association Council Meeting on 6 
March 1995, the Turkish Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin put forward a very firm 
statement, emphasizing that Turkey disagreed with the EU Council decision and 
pointing out that the step to open negotiations on membership could lead to a 
permanent division of the island. Karayalcin concluded that in the "undesirable 
eventuality" of conducting talks exclusively with the Greek side, "Turkey will be left 
with no option but to take steps towards achieving a similar integration with the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."^^i This statement alone shows that "with 
passions running deep on both sides a solution is less easy than perhaps is thought by 
diplomats and others somewhat removed, necessarily, from the emotions of the 
conflict - a conflict in which seemingly rational solutions are often rejected by one side
or another. "1^ 2
Even though the new Turkey-EU institutional framework was agreed on 
politically at the 6 March 1995 Association Council Meeting, Greece persisted in 
impinging upon the terms of the Customs Union Agreement. Prior to the 30 October 
1995 Association Council Meeting which was to determine whether all technicalities 
had been met for the customs union to come into effect, Greece had threatened to block 
the meeting, unless parts of the political dialogue were downgraded from ministerial to 
bureaucratic status.^^^ It was only after lenghty debates that Greece promised to lift its 
veto threat. Several meetings scheduled according to the package of institutional
I^^d o d D, Clement (1995): The Cypnis Isssue. A Current Perspective; Huntington, 19. 
l^^EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1995b), 21.
I ^ d O d d  (1995). 23.
^^^BIRAND, Mehmet Ali (1995): "Greece gets what it wants this time, too”, in: Milliyet, 30 
October 1995, translation in Turkish Daily News, 31 October 1995.
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cooperation and political dialogue were downgraded in diplomatic level. Accordingly, 
meetings originally planned to be held at ministerial level will now be conducted on the 
level of general directors. Once again, the need for unanimity in the EU Council has 
revealed who can be kept hostage and who is the chosen victim in the EU-Turkey- 
Greece triangle.
Despite the fact that the Customs Union Agreement finally came into force on 
1 January 1996, Greek resistance against a smooth functioning of EU-Turkey relations 
cannot be ignored. While the customs union as such is determined to operate according 
to the given stipulations, the two accompanying measures which will be subject to 
political supervision, will continue to depend on Greece's good-will. Neither the 
political dialogue, nor the financial cooperation have been implemented correctly 
during the first half of 1996. Greece has successfully blocked the allocation of funds 
included for Turkey in the MEDA programme until July 1996 and has also objected to 
the initiation of institutional cooperation and political dialogue by having blocked the 
Association Council Meeting scheduled for 26 March 1996.^^ In retrospect, it can be 
concluded that throughout the negotiations Greece has protected its interests very 
skillfully, conducting the process with great success. As there is no indication that 
Greece is inclined to stop its general policy towards Turkey, it will continue to 
instrumentalizeits favourable position within the EU. Overall EU-Turkey relations will 
witness some repercussions arising out of this situation, since the EU will face rising 
cross-pressures from Athens and Ankara with Greece, as always since 1981, enjoying 
the advantages of EU membership.
l^AKYOL (1996), 2.
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4.1.2. Agenda-Setter II: The European Parliament
The Maastricht Treaty (Treay of the European Union, TEU) that came into 
force in 1993 expressed the Community’s will to turn the Common Market into a 
political union and added several policy sectors to the Union's acquis communautaire. 
Even though the TEU enlarged the scope of competence transferred to the 
supranational level, the new treaty did not introduce significant institutional changes to 
the new European framework from now on called European Union.
The European Parliament, composed of directly elected members since 1979, 
still suffers from a lack of relevant power. In contrast to other parliaments in 
representative democracies which function as legislative bodies, control, elect and vote 
out the executive and determine the budget, the European Parliament plays only a co­
operating role in the complex process of EC policy-making. The European Union stiU 
faces the inherent contradiction that the effect of its policies are clearly supranational in 
nature, whereas the decision-making process that leads to the formulation of these 
policies, however, functions by "pooling sovereignty, that is sharing the capability to 
make decisions among govemments"^^^.
While a large portion of the EU's decision-making process remains restricted 
to intergovernmental bargaining in form of EU Council decisions, the TEU has opened 
several domains of power to the European Parliament. These include a variety of 
functions like the power to dismiss the whole Commission under certain conditions, 
the right to be consultated in the appointment of some institutional nominees and to co­
operate in legislative as well as budgetary matters.
165k e 0HANE, Robert and Stanley Hoffmann (1991): The New European Community. Decision­
making and Institutional Change; Boulder, 7.
^^^for a detailed account on the strengthening of the EP’s position see DAUSES, Manfred A. and 
Friedrich Fugmann (1995): Die politisch-institutionelle Stellung des Europäischen Parlaments nach 
dem Maastricht-Vertrag, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. 3-4,13 January 1995,24 - 32 and 
WESTLAKE, Martin (1994): A Modem Guide to the European Parliament; London, Chapter 3.
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Even though its general significance is sometimes overestimated^^^, the 
European Parliament as a result of the TEU obtained some rights that make it a 
determined player of cmcial importance for the future o f EU-Turkey relations. In the 
post-Maastricht era, the European Parliament is vested with some external powers, like 
the assent to accession, whereby no state could become a member of the Community, 
unless the Parliament had given its assent by an absolute majority of its members. In 
May 1994 the EP exercised for the first time its new right to decide on the entry of new 
members to the Community, granted to it according to Article O, TEU. Thus, the 
accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU represented the first in a series of 
enlargements that from now on will be subject to the European Parliament's scrutiny.
With regard to the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement the European 
Parliament for the first time enjoyed its rights of ratification which are also linked to the 
conclusion of international agreements and agreements having important budgetary 
implications for the Community. As the Association Council decision 1/95 forsees the 
establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EC, provides for 
institutional cooperation and political dialogue as well as financial cooperation, its 
coming into force clearly depends on the European Parliament's assent.^^
The European Parliament, traditionally emphasizing issues of human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the position of minorities when referring to the EC's 
relations with Turkey^^^, on 16 February 1995 passed a resolution on the Draft 
Agreement on the Conclusion of a Customs Union between the EU and Turkey.^^® 
The resolution underlined the EP's evaluation that the state of human rights in Turkey
167t s e b ELIS, George (1992): The European Parliament under the cooperation procedure: The Power 
of the Conditional Agenda-Setter, Working paper 1.7, Center for Germanand European Studies, 
University of California at Berkeley, August 1992.
^^^on the legal background of this constellation sec NEUWAHL, Nanette (1996): The European 
Parliament and Association Council decisions: The exemple of decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council, in: Common Market Law Review, Vol.33, N o.l, 51 - 68.
^^^GENCKAYA, ömer Faruk (1995): European Parliament and Human Rights Issues: The Case of 
Turkey, Paper presented at the Conference" The European Parliament and National Parliaments"; 
Wroxton College, 18-19 November 1995.
UOe u r o p e AN PARLIAMENT (1995a): Entschließung zum Entwurf eines Abkommens über eine 
Zollunion zwischen der EU und der Türkei, DOC. PE 187.047,16 February 1995.
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was too grave as to allow for the formation of the proposed Customs Union at present. 
Since all EU institutions acknowledged the importance of the conditionality clause on 
human rights with regard to agreements with third countries, the EP appealed to the 
Turkish government and to the Turkish Parliament to undertake a fundamental reform 
of its Constitution in order to better guarantee the protection of democracy and human 
rights in Turkey. To this end, the EP called on the Commission to establish a system 
of interim reporting on the modifications currently being made to the Turkish 
Constitution and more generally on the measures taken and to be taken to strengthen 
the rule of law. In addition to that the EP reminded the Commission and the Council 
that the planned agreement establishing a customs union between the EU and Turkey 
must be submitted for the Parliament's assent which it intends to make conditional on 
the interim reports on progress made. The European Parliament renewed its opposition 
to the Customs Union with Turkey in a Resolution passed in preparation o f the 
meeting of the EU Council scheduled for 26-27 June 1995 in Cannes.^^*
As the Association Council had agreed on the customs union and the attached 
measures in its decision 1/95 on 6 March 1995, it became apparent that the coming into 
effect of the CUA would depend on the outcome of a political bargaining process 
which involved the European Parliament setting a number of political preconditions on 
the one hand and the Turkish government and Parliament as the relevant bodies trying 
to fulfill these conditions on the other hand.
On 23 June 1995 the EU Council asked the EP to open procedures to come to 
a legislative decision concerning the implementation of a customs union between 
Turkey and the EC. On 10 July 1995, Klaus Hansch, President of the European 
Parliament entrusted the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy as 
the Committee in charge with this matter. The Committee on External Economic 
Relations was nominated to function as an advisory committee. On 13 October, the EP
^^^EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995b): Resolution on the European Council in Cannes, DOC. PE 
192.034,13 June 1995.
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President announced that he had also transfered the issue to the Committee on Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs as an advisory body.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy appointed 
Carlos Camero González as rapporteur on the final phase of the EU-Turkey customs 
union. The Committee in charge followed a common practice, as the EP operates a 
rapporteurship system for organizing its Committee work. The rapporteur is 
responsible for drawing up the committee's report. During this process, the rapporteur 
receives staff support and a budget, amends the report in the light of committee 
discussions and presents (and defends) it to the floor of the House. The final report is 
supposed to reflect the consensus, or at least the majority view, within the committee, 
even if such a view contradicts the rapporteur's p r e f e r e n c e s . A s  the internal 
organization of the EP operates on the basis of this coordination, it is suggested to take 
a closer look at the work of the rapporteur, in order to portray the position o f the EP 
with regard to the customs union.
In September 1995 rapporteur Camero Gonzalez went on a fact-finding 
mission to Turkey, in order to prepare a report to be presented and discussed with the 
members o f the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy. The 
visit^^3^ during which the rapporteur met with a range of political representatives, 
human rights organizations, intellectuals, journalists and leading economic figures, 
served one overarching purpose. In light of the fact that the European Parliament had 
linked its approval of the customs union to progress being made with regard to 
democratization measures, the fact-finding mission was devoted to assess whether 
progress in these issues had been achieved or could be expected before the EP would 
have to give its vote in December.
^^^BOWLER, Shaun and David Farrell (1995); The Organizing of the Eu''(i)ean Parliament: 
Committees, Specialization and Co-ordination, in: British Journal of Political Science, Vol.25, No.2 
242.
^^^for the summary report see EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995c): Report by Mr Camero 
Gonzalez for the Commiuee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy on the fact-finding 
mission to Turkey of 13-16 September 1995; DOC PE 214.242,29 September 1995.
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The unified echo of most diplomats, journalists and political party leaders 
alike, however, stressed the impression that a negative vote would cause a sudden halt 
in the process of democratization, an increase in radical nationalism and would be 
perceived as a lasting rejection, both by political circles and public opinion, of greater 
integration into Europe. Most agreed that a rejection by the European Parliament would 
mean at least temporarily, a freezing of the reforms and a hardening of anti-European 
sentiment. Except for the representatives of the Turkish human rights organizations, all 
persons inquired put forward the view that it would either be "counterproductive to set 
conditions" or that a rejection by the European Parliament would "be taken advantage 
of by the nationalist forces in the various political parties and would strengthen those 
advocating a tougher approach in the fight against terrorism".*^'*
The summary report, put together by Camero Gonzalez, is striking in two 
respects: First of all, it displays that during most of the discussions held, the issues 
themselves feU short of consideration. Instead, it was underlined that the overaU impact 
of the EP's decision would have to be granted considerable attention. A careful 
political impact-assessment would prove necessary if  the EP intended to continue to 
pursue its demands for further democratization. What is just as striking, however, is 
the evaluation by the rapporteur that "the positions adopted by the EP have helped to 
establish this process of transition and are not in the least counterproductive vis-à-vis 
its further development; I, therefore, do not share the view that the attitude adopted by 
the EP is strengthening or could strenghten the conservative or fundamentalist sectors 
whose influence is based on political and socio-economic phenomena apparent in 
Turkish society"*^^.
Despite the obvious discrepancy with regard to political impact assessment, 
the summary report concludes that "the current political system in Turkey is, no matter 
how you look at it, an incomplete democracy lacking notably in mechanisms essential
174EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995c), 14. 
175EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995c), 17.
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for very important fundamental freedoms to be e x e r c i s e d " C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  the 
working paper prepared for the Committee^^^ indentified six key areas, in which 
progress is deemed necessary: reform of the constitution of 1982, improvement of the 
situtation of Turkish MP's of Kurdish origin in the DEP, change of Anti-Terror Law 
(No. 3713), improvement of the overall situtation of human rights in Turkey, political 
solution to the "Kurdish question", improvement of the situation on Cyprus.
4.1.3. Major Political Issues
In the following, it is intended to review some of the major political issues 
debated as part of the political bargaining process initiated by the European Parliament.
- Reform o f the 1982 Turkish Constitution
The 1982 Constitution formally allows for the development of procedural 
democracy. It is based on a balance of powers between executive, legislative and 
judiciary. Several stipulations, however, heavily impede upon the consolidation of 
democracy in the sense of Western liberal democratic systems. The 1982 constitution, 
as did the military take-over of 1980, aimed, above all, at the depoliticization of 
Turkish society. Consequently, it restricts political participation in several relevant 
sectors, such as trade unions, associations and co-operatives. As far as the relation 
between citizen and state is concerned, authority of state enjoys priority over individual 
rights. Thus, several basic rights cannot be guaranteed, despite the fact that Turkey 
signed in 1987 the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). In addition to 
that, the 1982 Constitution contains in article 15 the stipulation that decisions and laws
I'^ '^ euroPEAN parliament (1995c), 17.
^^^EUROPÄISCHES PARLAMENT (1995d): Aibeitsdokument über die Aushandlung und den 
Abschluß eines Abkommens betreffend die Zollunion mit der Türkei, Berichterstatter: Herr Carlos 
Camero Gonzalez, IXXT PE 214.823,16. Oktober 1995.
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dating from the transition period (1980 - 1983) are to remain untouched by 
jurisdiction. The wide range of laws that have remained unchanged for this reason, but 
still impede ирюп further démocratisation has led experts to refer to the existence o f a
"meta-constitution".
Constitutional modifications have been undertaken in 1987 and 1993, 
however, without bringing about substantial changes. In January 1995, the necessary 
number of signatures was collected to submit to the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
a "democracy package" of 21 amendments to the Constitution. None of the proposals 
for amendments, however, explicitely involved provisions for promoting and 
protecting individual rights and freedoms or guarantees for safeguarding human 
r i g h t s . A  first attempt to agree on the changes failed, because the proposal did not 
receive the necessary majority of 300 votes. During a second session on 23 July 1995, 
360 parliamentarians gave their positive assent.
The main changes include the right for assocations (art.33) and trade unions 
(art.52) to participate in political life, the right for civil servants to found unions 
(art.53), reduction of voting age from 20 to 18, the right to vote for Turkish citizens 
living abroad and the right to vote for citizens in prison (art.67), the inclusion of youth 
into party work, the right for women to found associations, the right for university 
professors and students to become party members (art.68,69), the number of 
parlamentarians raised from 450 to 550 (art.75), the right to change the political party 
without loosing the mandate (art.84, 85), the right for professional associations to 
participate in political life (art. 135). Additional changes are of merely technical nature 
and can be neglected.
178for a genaal expertise, undisputed also among Turkish scholars see: RUMPF, Christian (1995): 
Türk Anayasa Hukukuna Giriş; Ankara.
^^^FRANZ, Erhard (1995): Die türkische Krise, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 
Vol.40, No.l 1, November 1995, 1307.
^^for a detailed summary of constitutional changes see: RUMPF, Christian (1995a): Die 
Verfassungsänderungen in der Türkei, Working Paper SWP-IP 2927, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik; Ebenhausen.
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In general, the constitutional changes have been commented as a positive step 
towards more democracy.^®! On closer scrutiny however, the constitutional reforms 
can be characterized as a "half-hearted, first step, which will begin to show its value 
only if these initial stages of reform will be pursued further"i82. Even though 
important aspects o f depoliticization have been changed, the reforms have not brought 
about any significant progress concerning basic and fundamental rights. Freedom of 
prees, i.e., as mled by Article 26, still remains incompatible with the ECHR or the 
concept of freedom applied in EU member states. With regard to basic social rights, no 
significant improvement has taken place. Public service employees still enjoy no right 
to strike.
The efforts towards democratization concerning the rights that counter 
depoliticization, however, suggest that the reform must be understood as a first 
positive step. As it is stressed in the final report by the EP rapporteur: "It should be 
pointed out that this is the first time that a Turkish Ptirliament composed of civilians 
has amended a constitution imposed by the military."!^^
In light of the fact that Turkey's representatives at the Association Council 
meetings were for a long time pressing for Turkey's full membership in the EU, it 
seems important to note that Turkey's constitutional basis does not provide for such an 
act. The current consitutional framework does not include the possibility of transfer of 
sovereignty rights. Thus, the Turkish Constitution still bears an overarching deficit as 
far as the integration with the EU is concerned.
- The Turkish MP*s o f Kurdish Origin in the DEP
^®^Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 July 1995, "Verfassungsreform als Schritt zu mehr 
Demokratie begrüßt".
1*2r u m p f , Chriitian (1996a): Die Verfassungsänderungen in der Türkei. Ein Schritt nach Europa?, 
unpublished paper, forthcoming in: Annales of the Faculty of Law, Istanbul University. 
183e u r 0PEAN p a r l ia m e n t  (1995e): Report on the proposal for a Council Decision on a 
common position by the Community in the EC-Turkey Association Council on establishing the final 
phase of the customs union. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy. Rapporteur 
Mr Carlos Camero Gonzalez; Strasburg, 11 December 1995,6.
^®^RUMPF, Christian (1995b): Nationale Verfassung und Beitritt zur EU. Beispiel Türkei, in: A.Ü. 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol.50, No.1-2, Ocak - Haziran 1995; Ankara.
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The lifting of the parliamentary immunity of six members of the Demokrasi 
Partisi (Democracy Party, DEP) on 2 March 1994 has taken a prominent place among 
the issues in Turkish internal politics to which a wide range of attention has been 
devoted by the European public at large. As a result, the European Parliament tabled no 
fewer than four resolutions on this issue alone and on 28 March 1994 decided to freeze 
the EU-Turkey joint parliamentary committee*® .^
The arrest of the DEP MP's was timed just before the 29 March 1994 partial 
local election under the initiative of the Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party, DYP): 
"Presumably, the political purpose was to give the image to the Turkish public that 
DYP stands tough against terrorism and seperatism"!*^. The DEP was closed down by 
the Constitutional Court on 16 June 1994. On 8 December 1994, six members o f the 
DEP and two other Turkish MP’s of Kurdish origin were sentenced to between three 
and a half years in prison for seperatist propaganda and fifteen years in prison for 
supporting an armed terrorist group. On 26 October 1995 the Turkish Supreme court 
issued a judgement confirming the 15-year prison sentence imposed on four DEP 
members for setting up and being members of an armed group while the sentences 
imposed on two MP's were quashed and the two were released. The Court overturned 
the convictions of the other two and ordered that they be retried under the revised 
Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law. The four whose convictions were affirmed are 
appealing to the European Human Rights Commission. The government has publicly 
affirmed that it will respect that body's decision.^*’^ Turkey recognizes the European 
Court of Human Rights jurisdiction in the matter of individual appeals since January 
1990. In addition to that Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European 
Commission of Human Rights since January 1987.
185e u r 0PEAN PARLAIMENT (1994): Resolution on the trial of members of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, Doc. PE 182.023,28 March 1994.
(1995), 27.
187y il m a Z, Sinan (1996): DEP deputies to take their case to European Human Rights 
Commission, in: Turkish Daily News, 9 January 1996.
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The HP’s final report concludes: "The Turkish authorities should not be 
surprised at the indignation aroused internationally, and in Europe in particular, at the 
arrest and sentencing of the MP's; it is indeed totally unacceptable that our colleagues, 
in whatever part of the world, should be prevented from carrying out their political 
activities. These should, if necessary, be the subject of political debate that is natural to 
a democratic system. A democracy and a constitutional state are not defined by the 
imposition of the political positions of the majority but by respect for minorities and the 
expression of their views, in a system of mutual respect within republican legality 
which must guarantee a peaceful debate between all parties."^^^
- The Anti-Terror Law
The "anti-terror law" (No. 3713) (ATL), was adopted on 12 April 1991 in 
order to combat those organizations which "intend to alter the nature of the Republic as 
defined in the Constitution". Article 8 in particular was to arouse international criticism 
in that it was used to repress forms of political dissent targeted at the integrity of the 
state. The EP's report notes that although the reasoning behind the law was to confer 
legitimate instruments on the Turkish state to defend itself from any terrorist and 
subversive attempts to change the nature of the state and its unity, "it must be said that 
the wording of Article 8 of the ATL and, in particular, its implementation have 
introduced repressive, intimidatory and essentially anti-democratic practises into 
Turkish society by the State Security Courts."^®^
The ATL has to be seen as an answer of the Turkish state to the challenge of 
terrorism, committed by the forces of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Worker’s Party 
of Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of Turkey. The law has been introduced as an 
instrument to further guarantee the "territorial integrity" of the Turkish State. The 
notorious Article 8 of the ATL declares any kind of seperatist propaganda a criminal
188EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995e), 7. 
IS^EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995e), 8.
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offense. Unlike usual forms of criminal law under which facts represent the elements 
of offense, Article 8 is directed at "thought crime" curtailing the exercise o f the 
right to freedom of information and freedom of expression. What makes this kind of 
"thought crime" essentially anti-democratic is the fact that the Turkish jurisdiction has 
not succeeded in defining clearly what "propaganda directed against the indivisible 
unity of state with its territory and people" actually m e a n s . T h i s  incapability has 
given more weight to the interpretation that Article 8 offers potential possibilities of 
arbitrary use of power. In this respect alone Article 8 does not fit the concept of a 
nKxlern and democratic constitutional state.
On 27 October 1995, the Turkish Parliament decided on a reform of the ATL. 
The main changes include; the prison sentence for "seperatist propaganda" reduced 
from between 2 and 5 years to between 1 and 3 years; the prison sentence may be 
converted into a fine of between 100 and 300 million Turkish lira, at the total discretion 
of the judge; the notion of "intentionality" has been introduced; the "explanatory 
memorandum" makes it incumbent on judges to implement the new law in the light of 
the European Convention on Human Rights; all the trials conducted hitherto on the 
basis of Article 8 must be reviewed,
All in all, it is justified to call the reform of the ATL a "cosmetic reform" 
With reference to Article 8 many jurists shared the opinion that "there is not much 
difference between the old and the new"^^^. It has to be conceded, however, that
l^OöZBUDUN, Ergun (1996): Democratization in the Middle East Turkey: How far ftom 
consolidation?, in: Journal of Dmeocracy, Vol.7, No.3, July 1996,135.
^^^a point made by Christian Rumpf at a seminar organized jointly by the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation and Turkish Democracy Foundation: "Terörle M ücadele Yasasimn 8. Maddesi Ve 
D em okratik Hukuk Devleti Semineri", Ankara, 4 December 1995.
*^^For a lenghty discussion of Article 8 in comparative perspective see: RUMPF, Christian (1996b): 
Das türkische Antiterrorgesetz Artikel 8. Staatsschutz und Gesinnungsstrairecht im demokratischen 
Rechtsstaat, in: KAS Auslandsinformationen, 2/96,27 - 65.
193changes summarized according to EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995d), 9.
^^'*this judgement is also upheld by Cetin özek, professor of law at the University of Istanbul, see 
the one page interview "Problems remain with A ^cle 8", Turkish Daily News, 6 November 1995. 
I^^y il m a Z, Sinan (1995): Article 8 amended without opposition, in: Turkish Daily News, 1 
November 1995.
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following the review of article 8 more than 120 of the 146 eminent politicians, trade 
unionists, journalists, lawyers and authors were released from prison.
Yet, staunch fighters for participatory democracy maintain that even if Article 
8 were abolished, total freedom of expression could still not be guaranteed. Thus, "the 
very existence of a division between 'civil justice' (administered by ordinary courts) 
and 'military justice' (administered by State Security Courts)" remains in the center 
of the European Parliament's critique.
- Human Rights
On the highly sensitive issue of human rights, the European Parliament 
maintains the position that "the situation in Turkey continues to be a cause of concern 
to the international community"'^^. The EP's report mentions the existence of political 
and other extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture and other cruel or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention, denial of fair public trial 
and other allegations. The EP's central accusation is directed at the vacuum of control 
in which security forces operate: "While it may be true, as the Commission maintains 
in it documents, that there is a 'latent predisposition of Turkish society to accept the 
use of physical torture to obtain otherwise legitimate results' it cannot be accepted - by 
any system calling itself democratic - that the army, the military, the state security 
forces and the secret services should be allowed total freedom of action, with no 
formal effective democratic supervision, in the name of the independence, the integrity 
or the greater good of the state."
Even though the section on human rights in the EP report is kept rather 
moderate in tone, it cannot be denied that it lacks positive encouragement. 
Improvements, such as the March 1995 Prime Minister's second circular stating the 
unacceptability of torture and the personal intervention of the State Minister of Human
‘96EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995c). 9. 
19"^ EUR0PEAN parliament (1995c), 10. 
198EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995c). 11.
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Rights in several torture cases to ensure that they were brought to trial, do not find 
mention in the HP's rep o r t .L ik ew ise ,  violations and killings committed by PKK 
terrorist forces are not included in this section of the report either.^^
- The "Kurdish Issue"
Most of the above mentioned issues of political debate find their origin in 
what is known as the "Kurdish issue", the difficulty of finding a (peaceful) solution to 
the waging war in the southeast of Turkey involving the Turkish Army on the one 
hand and the terrorist group PKK on the other hand. The "Kurdish question" 
represents one of the fundamental cleavages in Turkish contemporary society which 
for several years has been striking at the very foundations of the Turkish nation-state. 
Since hardly any other issue in Turkish politics is as complex and entangled with a 
long history^o^ a satisfactory reconciliation of West European and Turkish views of 
this problem seems to be very difficult to achieve. Although there certainly are some 
misunderstandings or misjudgements on the side of the West Europeans, as Turkish 
official and public opinion suggest, the main underlying factor seems to be conceptual 
differences with regard to the substantial content of the notions of "minority" and 
"nation state" and the inherent relationship between them.202 As the "indivisible unity 
of the state" is mentioned 17 times in the 1982 constitution, this postulate has given 
room to developments which had extinguished for a long time the rights of minorities. 
The restrictions that the last military regime placed on the use of the Kurdish language, 
i.e. were replaced only in 1991.
carefully examined, yet unemotional account of the human rights situation is provided by the 
UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT (1995): Country Report Human Rights: Turkey: 
transcript provided by United States Embassy; Ankara.
^ ^ t  has to be noted, however, that the EP had released a lenghty resolution condemning PKK terror. 
This is sometimes overlooked, see: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (19950: Résolution sur la visite du 
Troika à Ankara et l'intervention militaire de la Turquie dans le nord de l’Irak, PE 189.074,6 April 
1995, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1993a): Resolution on the terror campaign of the PKK, Doc. 
B3-1023/93; 15 July 1993, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1993b): Resolution on the kidnappings by 
the PKK, Doc. B3-1256/93; 16 September 1993.
^^MCDOWALL, David (1996): A Modem History of the Kurds; London.
202yE(3Ejq, ^fçsut (1996): The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity, in: 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.2, No.2,216 - 229.
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The apparent insistence on a purely military solution to the PKK problem has 
only increased the polarization and separation of Kurds and Turks. After ten years of 
war, not only PKK militia, but also several hundreds of Turkish soliders have been 
killed. This has in turn led to the rise of exaggerated nationalism, a constant 
undercurrent in Turkish society. As a result o f the PKK’s campaign of "total war" in 
1993, i.e., the "majority of citizens spent Republic Day (29 October) in a nationalistic 
and anti-Kurdish mood"^*®. Thus, the necessary precondition to come to a solution of 
the Kurdish issue, that is to differentiate between PKK terror on the one hand and the 
cultural demands of the Kurds on the other hand^04, has not been facilitated.
While the offical Turkish point of view denies that these aspects are 
intrinsically linked, it is broad consensus among Western Europeans and within the 
European Parliament that "the end of military hostilities could create the political 
conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the Turkish and Kurdish communities in 
Turkey, in the context of respect for Turkey’s territorial integrity as state, as the 
majority o f the population certainly wants."205
As for the likelihood for achieving a peaceful solution to the "Kurdish issue" 
and the problem of terrorism, it has to be pointed out that business has recognized that 
the establishing of necessary stability in Turkey is inevitably linked to the "Kurdish 
issue". It was on behalf of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce and Commodity 
Exchange that a (controversial) report "Eastern Question - Diagnosis and 
Observations" was released in July 1995, in order to analyse publicly the situation in 
Turkey’s southeast.206 Likewise, the chairman of the Turkish Industrialists and 
Businessmen Association (TÜSIAD), Halis Komili declared that the "Kurdish 
question is central to all others’’207.
203g x jn teR, Michael M. (1994): The Changing Kurdish Problem in Turkey; London, 22. 
2®^GENCKAYA,Dmer Faruk (1994): The Kurdish Issue in Turkish politics, in: CALLEJA, James 
et.al. (eds.): The Search for Peace in the Mediterranean Region. Problems and Prospects; Malta, 187 - 
213.
205EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (I995e), 12.
206yiLMAZ, Sinai (1995): Report: Turkey's Kurds oppose seperate slate, in: Turkish Daily News, 4 
August 1995.
207jee the one-page interview with Halis Komili in; Turkish Daily News, 21 December 1995.
7 9
4.2. Reactions in Turkey
The reactions in Turkey^®* on the major political issues brought up by the 
European Parliament have to be evaluated in light of the question whether external 
criticism and above all, the formulation of political preconditions can achieve their 
aims: "As always in such cases there is room for debate as to whether censure or 
tolerance, sticks or carrots are the best way to ensure progress. Given the extreme 
sensitivity of Turks to foreign criticism it seems probable that, to the extent possible, 
encouragement and acceptance will be more productive than condemnation."209
Even at random, the European Parliament is perceived in Turkey as 
"generally hostile"2io. The estimation in Turkey of the E F s pressuring influence 
ranges from officially diplomatic assessments expressing a moderate form o f 
disagreement with the European Parliament to strict disapproval. Diplomatic circles 
maintain that "the European Parliament is in search of its identity. Therefore its actions 
are not natural. Besides, national parliaments have more responsibility. Obviously, the 
European Parliament tries to prove itself."2H Internal assessments of the EP, 
however, express their opinion on the European Parliament more frankly. The 
Secratary General of the Iktisadi Kalkinma Vakfi (Economic Development Foundation, 
IKV), a think-tank that was established in the 1960s in order to assist in Turkey's 
integration with the European Community, clearly stated: "With regard to the questions 
asked by the European Parliament during this year, I think that this body is actually 
unprepared to give an assent. Quite frankly, with the European Parliament, they have 
created a Frankenstein."2i2
i
208id j2^ Semih (1995): Anger mounts in Ankara over European pressures on rights, in: Turkish 
Daily News, 9 November 1995.
209MARTIN (1994), 132.
210e r t a n , Nazlan (19%): 1995 marked by achievement of Customs Union, Turkish Daily News, 4 
January 1996.
2 ' ^ Interview with özdem Sanberk, Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Turkish Embassy, 
London, 31 July 1995.
2l2interview with Emre Gönen, Istanbul. 14 November 1995.
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Another point raised indirectly against political preconditions and their 
realizability, referred to the observation that "the état d'ésprit o f the European 
Parliament can best be characterized as lack of familiarity with Turkish reality."2i3 
Without prior examining of the causes for certain general situations, it is often stated 
by diplomatic circles, aims will be difficult to achieve. With regard to the only slight 
ammendment of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorist-Law one official at the US embassy in 
Ankara underlined that "this is the most you can get out of this parliament". Refering to 
the representative cross-section of Turkish MPs, the diplomat said that "until now the 
level of sophistication is low. Hopefully the next election will bring more intelligent 
candidates into Parliament. At least now a lot more brain power will run than before, 
not being tied to clan responsibilities,
4.3. Ratifiying the Customs Union Agreement 
Internal and bilateral dynamics reconsidered
When the European Parliament convened on 13 December 1995, in order to 
discuss in a final debate whether to give or deny its assent for the coming into force of 
the Customs Union Agreement it was facing a difficult decision. In his final report that 
was presented to the floor, the rapporteur of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Security and Defense Policy, Carlos Camero Gonzalez, concluded that "the existing 
political system in Turkey is in all respects a democracy which must be perfected, and 
in which there is a distinct lack of essential mechanisms for the exercise of important 
fundamental freedoms.
In addition to this conclusion, the MEP’s had to consider that they had only 
partially succeeded with their original idea to use the process of ratification to exercise
2'^Interview with Laurent Billi, Second Secretary French Embassy; Ankara, 7 June 1996. 
^'''interview with Janice Weiner, Second Secretary, responsible for evaluation of human rights. 
United States Embassy; Ankara, 7 November 1995.
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leverage on the Turkish Authorities in an attempt to improve democracy and human 
rights. The main point of debate in the European Parliament coalesced around the 
question whether a rejection would support those who had done at least something 
towards démocratisation in Turkey, or their opponents.
Even though it cannot be taken for granted, it has to be pointed out that the 
extensive lobbying of both Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and Turkish Foreign 
Minister Deniz Baykal had an important impact on the decision in the European 
Parliament. Both politicians were engaged in lengthy lobbying journeys. Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller did not tire of advancing the argument that "Should Europe reject 
or delay our application, this will inevitably help extremist and anti-democratic 
forces".^^^ It was only after a meeting between British Labour Leader Tony Blair and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal in November, that the Socialists, with 217 
members the largest group in Parliament, on 6 December 1995 decided that they would 
vote in favour of the Customs Union.^i^ Many observers agreed that "the pro-Islamist 
threat helped to sweep the issue of human rights under the table
Even though it was clear that the Parliament as a whole was prepared to give 
its assent to the customs union, the contributions to the final debate reflect that it was a 
vote "contre coeur”. Overwhelmed by pressures from national governments and 
parties, persuaded by the arguments advanced by Turkish politicians or simply in 
doubt about the accuracy of their demands, the deputies left no doubt that their "yes" to 
the customs union represented no easy decision. Pauline Green, speaking for the 
Socialist Group opened her statement by saying that "whichever way Socialists vote 
today they will do so in sorrow, with heavy hearts and without enthusiasm."2i9 Other 
speakers pointed out that they would vote against the customs union, because the CUA
^^^HALISDEMIR, Orya Sultan (1995); PM John Major expresses support for customs union, in: 
Turkish Daily News, 23 November 1995.
^^^see Press Release by Pauline Green, Leader of the Group of the Party of European Socialists; 
London/Suasburg, 7 D um ber 1995.
^l^HALISDEMIR, Orya Sultan (1995): Human Rights and government’s wrongs still watched by 
Europe, in: Turkish Daily News, 19 December 1995.
^^^UROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1995g): Verhandlungen des Europäischen Parlaments, No.4-472; 
Strasburg, 13 December 1995,144.
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would arrange the relations with Turkey in an ambigious manner. Dominique Souchet, 
deputy of the Europe of Nations Group (EDN) pointed out that he would "vote against 
ambiguity, against a human rights policy with variable geometry. This is the only 
variable geometry that we oppose,
When the European Parliament adopted the legislative decision to establish 
the final phase of a customs union with Turkey with a vote o f 344 to 149, with 36 
abstainers, it linked its assent with a resolution on the situation of human rights in 
Turkey.221 Pointing out that "the situation of human rights and democracy still leaves 
much to be desired" the resolution appeals to all parties involved to engage in broad 
dialogue with each other to promote the respect for human rights and democracy.
220e u ROPEAN p a r l ia m e n t  (1995g), 166.
^ ' e u r o p e a n  p a r l ia m e n t  (1995h); Entschließung zur Lage der Menschenrechte in der Türkei, 
in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Nr.C 17,22 January 1996,46.
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5. Conclusion
Turkish-European relations have reached a new maturation with the 
implementation of a mutual customs union in the beginning of 1996. The new 
contractual framework which now defines Turkey-EU relations, however, still reflects 
a recurrent pattern that has been a permanent matter of contention ever since both 
parties entered into partnership. Contradictory basic interests, which both partners 
associate with the relations, prevail and therefore prevent a proper balancing of 
reciprocal responsibilities and obligations. Turkey's foreign policy elite still strive to 
become an integral part of the European Union, which demonstrates their desired end 
point for Turkey's societal modernization process. The Western Europeans, however, 
are mainly interested in maintaining close ties with Turkey for security reasons. Their 
motivation clearly excludes the future possibility o f Turkey's becoming an integral part 
of Europe, even though this point of view is not made explicit in Turkish-European 
communication channels.
The analysis of the Customs Union Agreement has revealed that the new 
institutional framework reflects this continuous discrepancy of interest. The Turkey- 
EU customs union is a unique construct because it does not clearly define their 
relations. Instead, it creates an ambiguous proximity between Turkey and European 
Union. On the one hand, it restores Turkey's "special relationship" with the EU and, 
with regard to status, catapults Turkey ahead of other states who queue up for 
admission. No other non-member of the EU is tied as closely to the Community as is 
Turkey. On the other hand, the new arrangement does not offer any definite 
perspectives with regard to further integration. The declarations surrounding the 
Customs Union Agreement painfully avoid any reference to Turkey's prospective 
membership. The European Union regards the new arrangement as the preliminary 
politique finalité  o f the relations, which will not automatically lead to further 
rapprochement. Turkey's full membership in the EU is presently not a viable prospect.
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Several political forces in the European Union categorically exclude this possibility. 
With these caveats in mind, the readiness and overwhelming enthusiasm several 
member states have articulated in favour of the Customs Union Agreement can be seen 
as politically inconsistent. This behaviour has aroused heightened political expectations 
in Turkey, ones which cannot be readily fulfilled.
This, in turn, has reinforced the perception of this unequal balance between 
both partners. In addition to that, the customs union brings about short-term political 
and economic disadvantages for Turkey. Economically, Turkey will have to bear the 
consequences of stiff competition the customs union will introduce, as EU-exports to 
Turkey will increase dramatically. Politically, Turkey will have to transfer part of her 
sovereignty to the EU without receiving direct political compensation. These 
disadvantages originating from the customs union were thought to be reconciled by 
additional measures. Whereas political dialogue and institutional cooperation were 
designed to make up for the loss of political sovereignty, financial cooperation was 
intended to alleviate the economic burden. Both instruments, however, are subject to 
political supervision and thus their implementation cannot be understood as an 
automatic process, since their coming into force depends on political decisions. 
Consequently, the new contractual framework bears several weaknesses. The 
examination of the institutional basis has disclosed that the arrangement does not reflect 
mutual interests and therefore impedes stable cooperation. In its present form, the 
Customs Union Agreement represents a highly unstable arrangement, which can not 
serve as a permanent basis for maintaining the relations. Thus, the original Turkish 
strategy of envisaging the CUA as a "stepping-stone" was not completely unfounded, 
since the Agreement carries with it a strong inherent dynamic which suggests further 
integration.
The analysis of the EU's foreign policy decision-making process has singled 
out two "agenda-setters" which stand in the way of Turkey's rapprochement with the
8 5
European Union. In this section the analysis has devoted particular attention to the role 
of Greece and has placed the new power base of the European Parliament under close 
scrutiny.
As EU-Council decisions require unanimity, the "Greek factor" has become a 
significant issue in EU-Turkey relations. With regard to future developments, 
however, it is important to note that the EU decision-making process is currently under 
revision. It can be expected that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which 
reviews the EU's institutional set-up, will introduce a model of "qualified majority" for 
EU-Council decisions. Thus, Greek resistance opposing a smooth functioning of EU- 
Turkey relations will decrease in importance, as the "Greek veto" will most likely cease 
to constitute a viable policy instrument for Athens. A solution to the stalemate in 
Cypras will nevertheless remain indispensible.
In addition to the "Greek factor", it has been noted that the political decision­
making process has opened horizontally. As the European Parliament (EP) is granted 
considerable new powers, the EU's foreign policy no longer remains domaine réservé 
of the executive. Behind these measures is a potentially dramatic change of basic 
principles of international politics: putting human rights first means that respect for 
individuals and individual rights acquires priority over respect for the sovereignty o f 
states. Since the European Parliament traditionally emphasizes issues of human rights 
and democracy, its new role will dramatically alter the past course of the relations. 
Turkish policy-makers must adopt to this new "code of conduct" in international 
politics, instead of rejecting all criticism and characterizing the European Parliament as 
the "enemy of Turkey". Turkey's "standard of democracy" will from now on be 
closely scrutinized. There is no doubt that "democracy" and the values connected with 
it will replace "geopolitics" as the key variable which will determine the future course 
of the relations. As these values constitute the fundamentals of European integration, it 
is very improbable that, with a more cohesive political identity, the European Union 
will make any concessions regarding the understanding of democracy. Closer
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involvement will depend on successful attempts, whether undertaken in Turkey alone 
or with external support and assistance from the European Union, to enhance Turkey's 
standard of democracy.
The majority of political actors in Europe have realized that consolidating 
Turkish democracy is no easy task. Subsequent attempts to dépoliticize the Turkish 
society after the military takeover in 1980 left behind a political system that seems to be 
trapped. This impasse all the more justifies external impulses.
As the thorough debate in the European Parliament has revealed, human 
rights issues do not represent a minor issue for the deputies. Accordingly, these issues 
are not debatable, no matter how difficult achievements in this sector appear to be. The 
permanent political debate in the EP has likewise revealed that the parliamentarians are 
willing to keep open all doors for dialogue. On the basis of sound assessments of 
Turkish internal pressures and dynamics, they have voted in favour of the Customs 
Unions Agreement, since they believed that this move would support the positive 
forces in Turkey. The EP's decision was by no means a "Yes" to Turkish democracy. 
It is incumbent upon Turkish actors, inside or outside Parliament, to send clear signals 
to Strasburg confirming that this message has been understood. Any attempt within 
Turkey to support continuous democratization will ensure that the European Parliament 
looks favorably upon these moves and continues its strategy of "positive 
encouragement". If no such signals emerge, the EP will become increasingly reluctant 
to put confidence in Turkish political actors. Instead they will turn to a strategy of 
"political conditionality" and will point to the "hit-and-run" mentality which is 
pervasive among the Turkish political elite. Turkish actors should not provoke such a 
shift of the EP's strategy, as it would prove detrimental for successful mutual 
rapprochement.
During this time of fundamental change, societal interests come to take a 
prominent place in foreign policy formulations. As the case of EU-Turkey relations
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shows, foreign policy decisions cease to be guided by a mere cost-benefit analysis. 
Likewise, topics such as "security” lose their significance as an exclusive priority in 
foreign policy. As this "modernisation" of foreign policy takes place under conditions 
of fundamental change of the international system, however, decisions cannot be 
guided by one principle alone. Paradigmatic change requires an interim period for the 
reconciliation of the aims of a world of societies and a world of states. Thus, foreign 
policy making will for a while witness a mix of Realpolitik and Idealpolitik.
As the above analysis has shown, relations between nations or group o f 
nations, can no longer be accounted for exclusively in terms o f relations between 
states. Even though this dimension offers potential clarity as far as the instimtional ties 
between nations are concerned, it nevertheless neglects the growing political relevance 
of societal actors. Thus, "international" will increasingly have to be analysed in terms 
of "inter-societal".
However, international politics will for a long time be dominated by both the 
world of states and the world of societies. The end of the cold war has brought about 
the end of an era. One of its most important features probably lies in the dissolution of 
fixed patterns. The world witnesses the emergence of a third option, located between 
exclusion and inclusion. One can slowly realize that relations may be dealt with in 
terms of an attitude of "as-well-as" rather than "either-or". Consequently, models such 
as "differentiated integration”, will come to take a prominent place, in order to 
overcome the former dichotomy of "inclusion" or "exclusion". As these flexible 
formulas enter the debate of EU-Turkey relations, they have to be understood as 
challenging concepts. Seriously assessing these new possibilités would give Turkish 
policy-makers a chance to replace wishful thinking by realism.
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